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Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide
TOM STACY*
The law ofhomicide is undergoing a little noticed but fundamental shift in how it
classifies intentional homicides. Under the traditional approach, just a few
aggravating and mitigating circumstances decide whether a killing is classified as
first or second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. This approach has begun
to give way to a new approach, which derives from the Model Penal Code'"s death
penalty provisions. The expanding use and larger significance of this new approach
outside of the death penalty has been largely overlooked.
This article examines the new approach as a generalframework for grading
intentional homicides. It argues that the traditional criteria for drawing lines
between offenses frequently produce results that offend the purposes of criminal
punishment and basic moral sensibilities. The new grading paradigm promises to
do much better by changing and expanding the circumstances relevant to the grade
of the offense and by permitting the weighing of aggravating against mitigating
circumstances where both exist. The article argues that even the new approach
must be modified to treat the killer's violation of family obligations as an
aggravating circumstance in many situations. Otherwise, the law leaves itself
vulnerable to a well-founded charge that it does not treat domestic violence with
the seriousness it deserves.
To illustrate its points, the article presents the text ofa draft statute based upon
the new approach, applies that statute to selected cases, and defends it against
pertinent objections.
* Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. The author would like to thank David
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last quarter century the law of homicide has come to incorporate two
competing pamdigms. Intentional homicides' are typically classified into the offenses
of first-degree or capital murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. 2
These offenses seek to classify intentional homicides according to their relative
seriousness, 3 and the choice among them can affect the length of imprisonment by
decades,4 as well as determine the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty.5 The
law is now in the midst of a little noticed paradigm shift in how the lines among these
various offenses are drawn.
IUnder generally applicable principles, a homicide is "intentional" if the defendant either had
the victim's death as his motive or was practically certain that his actions would result in the
victim's death. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 233-234 (1980);WAYNE R. LAFAvE &
AusmN W. ScoTr, JR., Cp.mNAL LAw § 7.2(a) (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCoTT];
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Homicide: Legal Aspects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRME AND JUSTICE 858, 859-
61 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
This article does not address which circumstances do and ought to operate as complete
defenses to homicide liability, such as self-defense. It also does not address the classification of
unintentional homicides.
2 See JOHN KAPLAN ErAL-, CRmAL LAW: CAsEs AND MATERLAs 347-48 (4th ed. 2000);
LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, § 7.7, at 642.
3 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.1 cmt. 2, at 6 (1980); Frank Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and
the Degree Device, 22 FORDHAm L. REv. 274, 275-76 (1953); Herbert Wechsler & Jerome
Michael, A Rationalefor the Law ofHomicide: I, 37 CoLtM. L. REV. 701,701-03 (1937).
4 See e.g. CAL PENALCODE §§ 189, 190, 192, 193 (West 1999) (punishment for first-degree
murder is death, life without parole, or twenty-five years; twenty years to life for second-degree
murder, and three, six, or eleven years for voluntary manslaughter); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1102, 2502, 2503 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (punishment for first-degree murder is death or
life imprisonment; life imprisonment for second-degree murder;, and not more than ten years for
voluntarymanslaughter); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401,21-3402(a), 21-3403,21-4635,21-4704,
21-4706 (1995 & Supp. 1999) (penalty for premeditated murder is death, mandatory forty years
imprisonment without deductions for good time, or life imprisonment; life imprisonment for
second-degree intentional murder, and between four and seventeen years for voluntary
manslaughter, depending on defendant's criminal history). Under the federal sentencing guidelines,
first-degree murder carries a presumptive sentence of life imprisonment; second-degree murder
carries a sentencing range as low as thirteen to sixteen years, depending on the perpetrator's
criminal history score; and voluntary manslaughter as low as five to six years, depending on the
criminal history score. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Al, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, 5A
(1987).
5 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1999); MD. CODEANN. art. 27, § 407 (1996); 18
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.. § 1102 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32(1)-(9)
(Michie Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1995).
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The traditional paradigm, which traces its roots to the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries,6 makes the grade of the offense dependent upon just a few aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Most jurisdictions put an intentional killing into the most
serious category of first-degree murder if it was accompanied by one of two
aggravating circumstances: premeditation or contemporaneous commission of a
dangerous felony.7 An intentional killing is assigned to the least serious offense
category of voluntary manslaughter if the killer was in the throes of an extreme mental
or emotional state, understandably created. 8 Second-degree murder is the default
category that encompasses killings not accompanied by one of these few aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.
Over the last few decades, a new and fundamentally different grading paradigm
has emerged. This paradigm, which derives from the Model Penal Code's death
penalty provisions,9 takes into account a much wider array of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Rather than focusing only on premeditation,
contemporaneous commission of a felony, and an overwrought emotional or mental
state, it considers numerous other aggravating and mitigating circumstances such as
whether the killer manifested extreme cruelty or the victim consented to the killing.
It also allows aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be weighed against each
other in cases where both exist All death penalty states and the federal government
now make some use of this new grading paradigm. 0
Although the new paradigm has had an increasing influence, its use so far has
been largely restricted to the implementation of the death penalty.11 No jurisdiction
has completely abandoned the traditional paradigm, which a majority ofjurisdictions
continue to use in distinguishing degrees of murder and which virtually all
jurisdictions use in drawing the line between murder and manslaughter.12
6 The doctrine that heat-of-passion, excusably provoked, reduces an intentional killing from
murder to manslaughter "began to assume a recognisable form and function" in seventeenth-
century England. AJ. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE. L.J 292 (1976).
The criminal statutes of the newly independent American states incorporated the common law
distinction between murder and manslaughter. In 1794, the Pennsylvania Assembly enacted a
statute that divided murder into degrees based on whether the killing was premeditated or not and
whether the killer was contemporaneously committing a felony. See infra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text.
7 See infra Part I.A.
8 See infra Part I.B. Some jurisdictions also reduce murder to manslaughter in cases of
'Imperfect' self-defense. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
9 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980).
10 See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text
11 For an explanation of how the relationship between the traditional and new paradigms
stands under existing law, see infra Part I.
12 See infra Part I.
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Scholarly attention to the new paradigm likewise has focused almost exclusively
on its current role in regulating the death penalty.13 This narrow focus is
understandable. 14 But it is unfortunate because the new paradigm is not merely a way
of implementing the death penalty. With or without a death penalty, it furnishes a
coherent alternative model for the classification of homicides generally. In the hue
and cry over the death penalty, this larger significance of the new paradigm has not
yet been widely recognized, much less evaluated.
This article's central thesis is that, with some significant modification of its
content, the new paradigm provides a sensible general framework for grading
intentional homicides. The paradigm shift now underway accordingly should be
pursued to completion. On any measure, the traditional paradigm produces glaring
13 The bulk of the literature is highly critical of existing death penalty law in both its
constitutional and statutory aspects. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California
Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283 (1997); Carol S. Steiker
& Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation ofCapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355 (1995); Daniel Givelber, The New Lzv
ofMurder, 69 ]ND. L.J. 375 (1994); Franklin E. Zimiring & Gordon Hawkins, A Punishment in
Search of a Crime: Standards for CapitalPuhishment in the Law of Criminal Homicide, 46 MD.
L. REV. 115 (1986). The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), marks the
beginning of significant constitutional regulation of the death penalty. According to the Furman
Court, the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from vesting sentencing juries with unfettered
discretion to decide which murderers or first-degree murderers deserve death. See infra notes 26-
28 and accompanying text. Critics of the Court's complex post-Furman death penalty
jurisprudence generally argue that it does not adequately narrow the class of murderers who are
eligible for the death penalty and still leaves the jury with enormous and largely unguided
discretion to impose death. But see David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme
Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals: Mild Success or
Major Disaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence and post-Furman statutes have been moderately successful in decreasing the
overinclusivity of the death penalty).
For an exception to the literature's concentration on the death penalty, see SAMUEL H.
PuLsBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER (1998).
Focusing exclusively on a rebibutivist view of punishment, Professor Pillsbury argues that bad
motive is the sine qua non of the most serious homicides. In his view, the new paradigm marks an
improvement over traditional law because many of the additional aggravating factors on which the
new paradigm relies involve "an especiallybad motive." Id at 110. Nonetheless, his prescription
for change differs fundamentally both from the new paradigm and this article's proposals. Unlike
Professor Pillsbury's proposal, the new paradigm and this article would, first, recognize
aggravating circumstances that are not directly related to the killer's motive but that nonetheless
strengthen the retnibutivist and utilitarian justifications for punishment; second, permit aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to be weighed against each other, third, generally treat the existence
of a family relationship as an aggravating circumstance; and, finally, extend the aggravating-
mitigating circumstances model to the law of manslaughter.
14 The new paradigm did originate as a means of implementing the death penalty. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62:10071010
CHANGING PARADIGMS IN HOMICIDE
inaccuracies in classifying intentional homicides according to their relative
seriousness. In defining the most serious category of intentional homicides, it
overlooks aggravating circumstances whose importance surpasses that of
premeditation as well as the mitigating significance premeditation itself sometimes
possesses. A physician who thoughtfully considers and accedes to a dying patient's
request for a lethal injection is guilty of first-degree murder while a father who
brutally kills his child in a rage over bed-wetting is guilty of a lesser offense. The new
paradigm, which some jurisdictions already have begun to use to distinguish degrees
of murder,15 helps avoid these problems by changing and expanding the aggravating
factors relevant to the identification of the most serious intentional homicides.
No jurisdiction uses this more expansive approach in identifying the least serious
offense category, voluntary manslaughter. Existing law instead takes an unduly
constricted view of the mitigating circumstances sufficient to reduce an intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter and also ignores the presence of aggravating
circumstances. The law's failure to consider the joint import of both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances has produced troubling results. In many of the cases now
classifiable as voluntary manslaughter, the defendant has killed a spouse, thereby
depriving his or her children of a parent and/or failing to respect the victim's legal
right to divorce. In allowing murder to be reduced to manslaughter despite the breach
of such family obligations, existing law leaves itself open to a well-founded criticism
that it does not treat domestic violence with the seriousness it deserves.16 In
appropriate circumstances, a breach of family obligations should be treated as an
aggravating factor relevant to the grade of the offense. The new paradigm, which
weighs both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, furnishes a better framework
for accomplishing this badly needed reform.
This article begins in Part I by chronicling the origins of the traditional paradigm
and the surprisingly swift rise of the new paradigm. Part H moves from description
to evaluation and critiques the traditional bases for dividing murder into degrees. It
argues that, first, premeditation and commission of a felony are not the only
aggravating factors that warrant placing an intentional killing in the most serious
offense category;, second, premeditation sometimes has mitigating significance; and,
third, other powerful mitigating factors can and sometimes do coexist alongside
premeditation. In Part III, this article presses parallel criticisms of the traditional line
between murder and manslaughter. In both its common law and Model Penal Code
incarnations, the law's current definition of the least serious category of intentional
homicides is both underinclusive because it considers too few mitigating
circumstances and overinclusive because it relies on circumstances lacking genuine
mitigating significance and because it ignores aggravating factors such as the killer's
breach of family obligations. Responding to these criticisms, Part IV outlines a
15 See infra notes 43-44.
16 See generally infra Part llI.
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reconstruction of homicide law that follows the general structure of the new
paradigm, albeit with significantly modified content. It sets forth a draft statute
embodying a proposed list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, illustrates the
proposed approach by applying it to selected cases, and responds to the most
prominent potential objections.
I. THE RISE OF THE NEW PARADIGM
The story of the new paradigm begins with the traditional approach it has already
begun to eclipse. The traditional approach has two separate components, one
concerned with dividing murder into degrees and the other with distinguishing
between murder and manslaughter.
A. Dividing Murder into Degrees
Under common law principles borrowed by the newly independent United
States, the death penalty was a mandatory punishment for all cases of murder.17 In an
effort to limit the scope of the death penalty, the legislature of the State of
Pennsylvania in 1794 enacted a statute dividing murder into first and second-degrees,
with the death penalty reserved for first-degree murder.18 Under the Pennsylvania
statute, intentional killings that are either premeditated or committed in furtherance
of a felony are treated as first-degree murder, while other intentional killings are
second-degree murder.19
The Pennsylvania statute proved popular. Throughout the nineteenth century
more and more American states followed its lead, dividing murder into degrees based
upon the presence or absence of premeditation or concurrent commission of a felony.
A majority of American jurisdictions still use the traditional Pennsylvania model as
a basis for distinguishing between degrees of murder.20
17 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
18 See MODELPENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 2, at 16 (1980). See generally Wechsler & Michael,
supra note 3, at 701-703; Brenner, supra note 3, at 275-76. For a discussion of the English law
antecedents of premeditation, see PLLSBURY, supra note 13, at 100-01.
19 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 2, at 16 (1980).
20 Twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government now make
premeditated killing first-degree murder. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1105
A.1. (2000); ARK. CODEANN. § 5-10-101(a)(4) (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West
1999); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(1)(a) (West 2000); D.C. CODEANN. § 22-2401 (Supp.
2000); FA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(a) (Michie
1997); IOWA CODEANN. § 707.2(1) (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(a) (1995);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1996); MAss. G(EN. LAws ch. 265, § 1 (1998); MICH. COw,. LAWS
ANN. § 750.316 (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.020
(1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-303 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT.
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In addition to giving rise to the Pennsylvania premeditation model in the late
eighteenth century, the death penalty's perceived problems also created the impetus
for the new paradigm in the mid-twentieth century. In limiting the mandatory death
penalty to cases of first-degree murder, the 1794 Pennsylvania statute began a long
trend of limiting the cases in which death was imposed. Throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries more and more legislatures eliminated mandatory death
penalties and gave juries discretion whether to impose death for first-degree murder.21
ANN. § 630:1-a (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1999); OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1998) (purposeful killings with prior
calculations and design constitute aggravated murder); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West
1998 & Supp. 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS. § 11-23-1 (Supp. 1999); S.D. CODED LAws § 22-16-4
(Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2301
(1998); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030
(West 2000); W. VA. CODEANN. § 61-2-1 (Michie 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (Michie
1999).
The number of states that use premeditation as a basis for distinguishing between first and
second-degree murder has decreased slightly over the last forty years. In 1959, thirty-four states
treated premeditated killings as first-degree murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 2, at 66
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia treat an intentional killing in the course of
committing a felony as first-degree murder or its equivalent. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105 A.2.
(2000); AnK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie 1997) (capital murder); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 1999); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(b) (West 2000); DEL CODE ANN. it. 11
§ 636(a) (1995); D.C. CODEANN. § 22-2401 (Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp.
2000); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (Michie 1997); 720 IL. COMe. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1 (West Supp.
1999); IOWA CODEANN. § 707.2(2) (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1995); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, 14:30.1 (West Supp. 2000); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 410 (Supp.
2000); MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.316 (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(e)-(f) (1999) (capital murder); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2-1(2) (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (felonymurder is first-
degree murder when killing is intentional and most directly resulted from acts of defendant rather
than someone else); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1999) (felony murder is first-degree murder when
committed with a deadlyweapon); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Anderson 1998) (purposeful
killings in commission of a felony are aggravated murder); 1I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp.
1999); S.D. CODnmD LAws § 22-16-4 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-202(2) (Supp.
2000); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(aX2) (Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(lXd)
(1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1998); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie Supp. 2000);
WASH REv. CODEANN. § 9A.32.030(lXc) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (Michie 2000);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (Michie 1999).
21 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-92 (1976) (footnotes omitted):
[B]y the end of Word War I, all but eight States, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia either had
adopted discretionary death penalty schemes or abolished the death penalty altogether. By 1963,




"By the mid-twentieth century, mandatory death penalties were rare and typically
confined to crimes hardly ever committed, for example, treason.') 2
Given that the death penalty was no longer mandatory for first-degree murder,
the question became how to decide who among the class of first-degree murderers
deserved to die. The law supplied standards governing eligibility for the death
penalty- the jurors had to find that the accused had committed a capital crime such as
first-degree murder.23 But beyond the threshold question of eligibility, the law
essentially left jurors on their own without any guiding legal standards.2 4 By the
1960s and early 1970s, a decision in favor of death had become a rare event as
prosecutors sought and juries exercised discretion to impose that penalty in just a
small fraction of cases involving commission of a capital offense 25
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court stepped in and forced states to change
their death penalty regimes. In Furman v. Georgia,26 the Court held that the
22 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 134; See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
198-99 (1971); MODELPENAL CODE § 201.6 cnt. 2, at 66 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
23 In addition to murder, many state statutes authorized the death penalty for rape and
kidnapping. A few even made robbery and/or burglary capital offenses. ThORsrEN SELWN, THE
AMERICAN LAW INS-rruTE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE
PROJECt OF THE AMEMCAN LAW INsrrruTE, at 3-4 (1959), reprinted in MODEL PENAL CODE
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
24 KAPLANETAL., supranote 2, at 510.
25 MODELPENALCODE § 210.6 cmt. 1, at 114-15 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
182 n.26 (1976) (noting estimate that "before Furman less than 20% of those convicted or murder
were sentenced to death in those States that authorized capital punishment'). " he annual average
[number ofexecutions across the entire United States] during the 1930s was 167; during the 1940s,
128; in the 1950s, 72; and 19 in the 1960s." 1 ENCYCLOPEDA, supra note 1, at 134.
26 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court rendered a brief per curiam opinion, which merely
declared the death sentences in the three casesbefore the Court in violation of the Eighth
Amendment In the accompanying concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall made clear
their view that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional in all circumstances. 408 U.S. at 305-06
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359, 369,370 (Marshall, J., concurring). The three other Justices
in the 5-4 majority took the more moderate position that the death penalty statutes in the cases
before the Court were unconstitutional as applied because they allowed the jury to impose death
for murder or rape without giving the jury any standards to guide its decision. Id at 256-57
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at 312-13 (White, J.,
concurring).
With the exception of the few little-used statutes maldng the death penalty mandatory,
Furman implied the unconstitutionality of all death penalty statutes then in force. Like the Georgia
and Texas statutes involved in Furman itself, those statutes gave the jury unfettered discretion
whether to impose death. "[O]n the same day Furman was decided the Court vacated death
sentences imposed in twenty-six states." Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New
Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974).
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infrequent imposition of the death penalty and the standardless discretion ofjuries to
impose it amounted to "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."27 Crucial to the Court's holding was the conclusion on the
part of the swing Justices that, as a result of the purely discretionary nature of the
decision, 'there is no meaningfil basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"2
In Furman's immediate aftermath, thirty-five states enacted death penalty
legislation aimed at allaying the Justices' concern for standardless death sentencing
discretion.29 The new statutes fell into two basic categories. A number of states
sought to eliminate sentencing discretion altogether by making the death penalty
mandatory for certain offenses.30 Many other states adopted an alternative approach
patterned in varying degrees on the death penalty provisions of the Model Penal
Code.31
In a series of 1976 decisions, the Supreme Court struck down mandatory death
penalty provisions32 but upheld the statutes based upon the Model Penal Code.33 As
Discussions of Furman and its "somewhat elusive demands" are legion. KAPLAN Er AL.,
supra note 2, at 512-13; see, e.g., sources cited infra note 33. For a particularly illuminating recent
account, see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13, at 361-71.
27 408 U.S. at 240.
28 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart put the same point, "These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual." 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (statutes gave "uncontrolled discretion" to sentencers and provided "no standards [to]
govern selection of the penalty").
29 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976); MODELPENALCODE § 210.6 cmt.
12, at 156 n.144 (1980) (listing seventeen states as having adopted death penalty statutes providing
for consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
30 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("following Furman 10 states enacted laws providing for mandatory capital punishment ); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 12, at 156 n.145 (1980) (listing eighteen states as having "adopted
mandatory death penalty statutes afterFurman').
31 The state statutes were patterned after section 201.6 of Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Model
Penal Code, promulgated in 1959. That section was then incorporated as section 210.6 of the
Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code published in 1962 and approved by the Council
of the American Law Institute in that same year. The Advisory Committee that drafted the model
death penalty provisions had voted 18-2 in favor of abolishing the death penalty but the Council
of the American Law Institute was "substantially united in the view that the Institute [could not]
be influential on [whether states chose to retain or abolish the death penalty] and should not,
therefore, take a position either way." MODELPENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 1, at 65 (Tentative Draft
No. 9, 1959).
32 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
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a result of these decisions, all death penalty regimes now effectively follow the basic
structure of the Model Penal Code.34
The Model Penal Code death penalty provisions have three basic features. First,
the Code bifurcates a capital trial into two separate phases, the guilt-innocence phase
and a subsequent sentencing phase.35 Second, in an effort to guide the sentencer's 36
deliberations, the Model Penal Code specifies eight aggravating factors and permits
death to be imposed only if the sentencer finds the presence of at least one such
factor.37 Third, it enumerates eight mitigating factors and permits a decision in favor
of the death penalty only upon consideration of the joint import of aggravating and
mitigating factors. 38
33 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). For useful discussions of Furman and the 1976 decisions, see
FRANKLuNE. ZIMRiNG & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMEPICAN AGENDA
50-73 (1986); MODELPENALCODE § 210.6 cmt 12, at 153-61; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13.
34 See MODELPENALCODE § 210.6 cmt. 12, at 171 (1980) (the actions ofthe Court have"left
Model Penal Code provision [§ 210.6] as the constitutional model for capital sentencing statutes");
Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 13, at 123 (after Furman the "Code provisions became the model
for capital punishment legislation"); infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
3 5 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.6(2) cmt. 8, at 144-49. The rationale for bifurcation is that the
alternative of deciding guilt-innocence and the appropriate punishment at the same time creates
an undue tension between the rationality of the two determinations. One large problem is that
evidence relevant to the appropriate punishment such as the accused's prior convictions may be
inadmissible on the issue of guilt or innocence due to its prejudicial impact. If such evidence is
admitted at a trial designed to decide both guilt-innocence and the appropriate punishment, the
rationality of sentencing decision is enhanced at the expense of detracting from the faimess of the
guilt-innocence determination. If such evidence is excluded, the fairness of the guilt-innocence
determination is enhanced at the expense of detracting from the rationality of the sentencing
decision. All death penalty schemes provide for a bifurcated decision making process. Steven
Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4, app. at 1 (1980).
36 The Model Penal Code sets forth alternative provisions, one set vesting the sentencing
decision with the same jury that determined the defendant's guilt and the other set with the
presidingjudge. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2)-(3) (1980). "in a majority of death penalty states,
the same right to a jury the defendant enjoys at the guilt phase applies at the penalty phase."
KAPLAN ETAL., supra note 2, at 527.
3 7 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (1980). The aggravating circumstances are: (a) the killer
was a convict in prison at the time of the killing, (b) the killer had a previous conviction for murder
or a violent felony;, (c) there were multiple victims; (d) the killer knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons; (e) the killing was committed in the course of a felony;, (f) the killing was
connitted to avoid arrest or to escape; (g) pecuniary gain was the motive; and (h) the killing
involved great cruelty. Id.
3 8 The sentencer may choose the death penalty only if "there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1980). The eight
enumerated mitigating circumstances are: (a) the accused had no significant criminal record, (b) the
victim participated in the accused's conduct or consented to the killing; (c) the accused believed
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Although the post-Furman death penalty statutes now on the books depart from
the Model Penal Code provisions in some significant respects,39 they share with the
Model Penal Code two basic features that, taken together, constitute a new paradigm
for grading homicides. First, they expand the aggravating circumstances that may
justify putting an intentional killing into the most serious offense category. In contrast,
the traditional paradigm relies upon only two aggravating circumstances-
premeditation and killing in furtherance of a dangerous felony. Second, the death
penalty statutes require consideration of mitigating circumstances as well as
aggravating circumstances.40 Indeed, for purposes of the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution requires that the sentencer be free to consider any
and all relevant mitigating circumstances.41 The traditional grading paradigm, in
there was moral justification for the killing, (d) the accused was an accomplice and his role in the
killing was relatively minor, (e) the accused acted under duress or was dominated by another, (f)
the accused's capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his action or control himself was
impaired by mental illness or by intoxication; and (h) the accused was youthful. Id. at § 210.6(4).
The sentencer may consider aggravating or nitigating factors beyond those that are enumerated,
but may impose death only if it finds the presence of at least one enumerated aggravating factor.
Id. at § 210.6(2) (The sentencer "shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances enumerated in sections (3) and (4) and any other facts that it deems relevant").
39 See KAPLAN ETAL, supra note 2, at 518-46; Zimfing & Hawkins, supra note 13, at 124-
25. The statutes typically make some changes to the list of aggravating and mitigating factors. For
instance, many states add the victim's status as a law enforcement officer or as a child or
vulnerable person as an aggravating factor. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-703 F.9. to 10. (Supp.
1999); Am. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604,5-4-605 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(aX7)-(8)
(West 1999). A few add premeditation to the list of aggravating factors. See CoLO. REv. STAT. 16-
11-103(1Xa) (2000) (appropriateness of sentence to be determined by three-judge panel rather than
jurors); Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-301 (1999) (same).
In addition, a number of statutes differ from the Model Penal Code on the standard governing
the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See infra note 40.
Death penalty statutes also differ from one another on the roles ofjudge and jury, see supra
note 36, as well as the applicability of reasonable doubt and unanimityrequirements. See McCord,
supra note 13, at 561-65.
40 Some states follow the Model Penal Code in directing the sentencer to weigh aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. However, others are largely silent beyond the standard requirement
that the sentencer find the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance. See KAPLAN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 544-46; Steiker & Stelker, supra note 13, at 386-87; Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts
of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating between Guilt and Punishment in Death
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21, 25 n.10 (1997). See generally Srikanth Srinivasan, Note,
Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-NonweighingDistinction, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1347
(1995). Still, especially in light of the constitutional requirement that the sentencer be free to
consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, see infra note 41 and accompanying text, it is not
clear "how decisionmaking could proceed in non-weighing states apart from some sort of
makeshift balancing or weighing." Steicker & Steicker, supra note 13, at 387 n.153.
41 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110
(1982); Lockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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contrast, takes no account of mitigating circumstances that also might be present
alongside the two aggravating circumstances it deems relevant In making numerous
aggravating and mitigating factors relevant and in requiring consideration of their
joint import where they coexist, the post-Furman death penalty statutes constitute a
fundamentally new approach for grading homicides.
Over two-thirds of the states now make some use of this new paradigm in
grading intentional murders. All death penalty jurisdictions, which include thirty-eight
states and the federal government,42 utilize the new paradigm in some fashion.
Several states' grading regimes explicitly incorporate it by defining the most serious
grade of murder in terms of numerous aggravating circumstances that make an
intentional killing death-penalty eligible.43 A few non-death penalty states also define
the most serious grade of homicide in terms of an expanded list of aggravating
circumstances characteristic of the new paradigm.44 Other states incorporate the new
paradigm into their grading schemes implicitly. A number of states do not formally
divide murder into degrees but, following the basic structure of the new paradigm,
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3593 (1994); 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1994); ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 to -53
(1994); ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (Supp. 1999); ARK. CODEANN. § 54-602 (Miechie 1997); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a (West Supp. 1999); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to 17-10-32 (1999); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-2515 (Michie Supp. 1999); 720 Ill. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1 (Supp. 2000); IND. CODEANN. § 35-
50-2-9 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)(b)
(Michie 1999); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 to 905.9 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch 279, §§ 68-70 (West 1992);
Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-101 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.001 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-18-301 to -310 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2523 (1995); NEy. REV. STAT.
§§ 200.030,200.033 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3
(West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CM. PROC. LAW
§ 400.27 (Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1999); OHio REv. CODE. ANN. §§ 2929.03-
06 (Anderson 1999); OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.095, 163.150 (Supp. 1990 & 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 1998 & Supp.
2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs
§§ 23A-27A-1 to -41 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1999); TEX. Clum.
P. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 10.95.020-.900 (West 1994
& Supp. 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (1999).
43 CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West Supp. 1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 519-
1 (West Supp. 2000); 8A LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West Supp. 2000); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-19 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, 630:5 (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125:27
(McKinney 1998); N.Y. Clum. PROC. LAW § 400.27.3 (McKinney Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.095, 163.150 (1990 & Supp. 1998); TEx. PENALCODEANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1994); UTAH
CODE.ANN. § 76-5-202 (1999).
44 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-701 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (Michie 1997);
RI. GEN LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (1998).
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make a murderer eligible for the death penalty based upon the presence of one of a
number of enumerated aggravating circumstances. 45 This approach implicitly divides
murder into two degrees, namely murders that are and are not subject to the death
penalty, and does so based upon the new paradigm. Many other states superimpose
the new over the traditional paradigm. They use the traditional approach's two
aggravating factors-premeditation and a killing in furtherance of a felony-to define
the category of first-degree murder and then list additional aggravating circumstances
to decide which first-degree murders are eligible for the death penalty.46 This has the
implicit effect of dividing murder into three degrees.47 The division between first and
4 5 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-2, 13A-5-49 (1994 & Supp. 1999); DEL CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1, 17-10-30 (1999); 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1 (West
Supp. 2000); IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-50-2-9 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 507.020, 532.025 (Michie 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 99-19-101 (1999); MoNT.
CODEANN. §§ 45-5-102,46-18-303,46-18-305 (1999); N.L STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp.
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 21, §§ 702.7,701.11,701.12 (Supp. 1999); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-
20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2000).
4 6 See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-703, 13-1105 (Supp. 1999); CAL. PENALCODE §§ 189
& 190.2 (West 1999); PLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04,921.141 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401(a), 21-3439 & 21-4625 (1995); MD. ANN CODE art. 27, §§ 407,413 (1996
& Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (West 1999) (specifying that premeditation is the only
aggravating factor that makes a killing first-degree murder and thereby eligible for the death
penalty); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-303,29-2523 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2000); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); 42 CONS. PA. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West
1998 & Supp. 2000) (specifying that premeditation is the only aggravating factor that makes a
killing first-degree murder and thereby eligible for the death penalty); SD. CODinD LAWS §§ 22-
16-4,22-16-12,22-6-1, 23A-27A-1, 23A-27A-4 (Michie 1998); TINN. CODEANN. §§ 39-13-202,
39-13-204 (1998); VA CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030, 10.95.020, 10.95.030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2000); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6-2-101,6-2-102 (Michie 1999); ef MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 265, §§ 1, 2, ch. 279, § 69
(Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 2000) (adding extreme cruelty and subtracting commission of a felony
from the list of aggravating circumstances that define first-degree murders eligible for the death
penalty and making a much longer list of aggravating circumstances relevant to the decision to
impose death in eligible cases); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-101, 5-4-604 (Michie 1997) (using
premeditation and a number of other aggravating circumstances to define capital murder and using
a somewhat different list to determine which capital murders deserve death); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-3-102, 16-11-103(5) (West 1999) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003, 19-2515(h)
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999) (same); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2929.04 (Anderson
1999) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030, 200.033 (1999) (adding additional aggravating
circumstances beyond premeditation and commission of a felony that define first-degree murders
eligible for the death penalty); N.L. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1994) (defining capital offense
of first-degree murder to include depraved heart murder); see also R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-23-1, 11-
23-2 (Supp. 1999) (specifying that premeditated killing is first-degree murder, and that the
additional presence of one of a number of specified aggravating circumstances justifies a sentence
of life without parole.).
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second-degree murder is based upon the traditional Pennsylvania model. The new
paradigm is then employed to fither subdivide first-degree murder into murders that
are and are not death-penalty eligible. Thirty years after its first adoption, the
jurisdictions that use the new paradigm actually outnumber those that rely exclusively
on the traditional approach.
Although the new paradigm's influence on the law of homicide has been
remarkable, it has been fundamentally incomplete. Its influence has been largely
confined to the death penalty context and has been primarily used in determining who
is eligible for it and, of those eligible, who deserves death. No state has yet adopted
it as a framework for grading intentional homicides generally, particularly for
determining which killings belong in the least serious offense category of
manslaughter.
B. Distinguishing Manslaughterfrom Murder
While the new paradigm has had considerable impact on the grading of murders,
it has essentially no impact on how the law draws the line between murder and
manslaughter. Contemporary American jurisdictions follow one of two approaches
in classifying intentional killings as murder or manslaughter. The overwhelming bulk
of jurisdictions essentially follow the common law, which reduced an intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter when the killer was in the throes of an excusably
provoked state of passion.48 Eleven states follow the Model Penal Code provision. 49
47 Virginia does this explicitly. Capital murder consists of a premeditated killing
accompanied by one of many specified aggravating circumstances. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999). First-degree murder consists of felony murder and premeditated
killings unaccompanied by an aggravating circumstance. § 18.2-32. Second-degree murder
encompasses other murders. Id.; see also WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (West Supp. 2000)
(defining "aggravated murder" as premeditated killing or felony murder accompanied by one of
a number of specified aggravating factors).
48 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(2) (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (2000); ARIz. REv. STAT.
§ 13-1103 A.2 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999); GA. CODEANN. § 16-5-
2 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-4006 (Michie 1997); IND. CODEANN. § 35-42-1-3 (West 1998); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 707A (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3403(a) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:31 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 203 (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
Crimes and Punishment § 387 (1996); MAss ANN. LAws ch.265, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp.
2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 350.321 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West
Supp. 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023 (West 1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-305 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.050,200.060 (Michie 1999); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-4 b.(2) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3A (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-18 (1993); Oaio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (Anderson 1999); OKILA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 711 (West 1983); 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2503(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); RI. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-3 (1994) (incorporating common law manslaughter); SD. CODIFIEDLAWs § 22-16-
15 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-211 (1997); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d)
(Vernon 1994) (treating heat-of-passion as a form of mitigated murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13,
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Instead of incorporating the new grading paradigm apparent in the Code's own death
penalty provisions, the Model Penal Code's manslaughter provision is a broadened
version of the common law.50
Like both the Pennsylvania model for dividing murder into degrees and the new
paradigm, the common law offense of heat-of-passion manslaughter emerged in
response to the death penalty. In seventeenth-century England, courts began to accept
the notion that certain heat-of-passion killings lacked the "malice aforethought"
necessary for murder and thus were not subject to the death penalty, then obligatory
for murder. Malice aforethought was said to be lacking when, first, the killer had lost
emotional control; second, the loss of control was triggered by some provocation on
the part of the victim; third, the provocation was one recognized as adequate to cause
an ordinary or reasonable person temporarily to lose control; fourth, the killer did not
cool offbetween the provocation and the killing, and fifdih, a reasonable person would
not have cooled off.51
At common law, only a few kinds of provocations were adjudged sufficient to
excuse the killer's state of passion and reduce the killing to manslaughter. Adequate
provocations included only: a violent assault or serious legal wrong inflicted by the
victim upon the killer's person; the killer's sight of his or her spouse in an adulterous
act; the sight of another being falsely arrested or deprived of his liberty;, or mutual
§ 2304 (Vernon 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-35 (Michie 1995) (incorporating implicitly the
common law concept ofmanslaughter); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-4 (Michie 2000) (incorporating
common law of manslaughter); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (Michie 1999) (same); cj. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-103-2(b) (West 1999) (treating comnimon law heat-of-passion killings as second-
degree murder carrying less serious punishment than other second-degree murders); 720 ILL.
COW. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-2 (b) (West 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.050,200.060 (Michie
1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.44,940.01,940.05 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (treating heat-of-passion
as second-degree murder).
49 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-104(aXl) (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-
54a, 53a-55(a)(2) (West 1994); DEL CODE ANN. tit 11, § 641 (1995 & Supp. 1998); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 707-702(2) (1993 & Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507.020, 507.030(1)(b)
(Michie 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (1999) (renaming manslaughter "mitigated
homicide"); N.H. REV. STAT. § 630:2 (1996); N.Y. PENALLAw §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01.2 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (Supp. 1998); UTAH
CODEANN. §§ 76-5-203(3), 76-5-205 (1999) (classifying extreme emotional disturbance killings
as a mitigated form of murder). See Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in
Search ofa Rationale, 73 . CRim. L. & CUMNOLOGy 421,431 n.105 (1982) (listingtwelve states
as having adopted the Model Penal Code provisions).
50 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2103 cmt. 5, at 53-54 (1980) ("This provision includes the
common-law doctrine of provocation but is not so limited in its scope.").
51 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, cmts. 1 & 5, at 44-46, 53-73 (1980);




combat between the killer and the victim.5 2 The common law deemed provocations
not fitting into one of these predetermined pigeonholes, such as insulting words or
invasions of property or contract rights, insufficient as a matter of law to mitigate
murder to manslaughter.53
Among the large majority of states that continue to employ the common-law
doctrine of heat-of-passion manslaughter, there is a trend toward broadening the
provocation pigeonholes and giving juries greater discretion to determine the
adequacy of the provocation.54 A number of states also will reduce an intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter in cases of "imperfect" self-defense. 55
The Model Penal Code provision incorporates and substantially expands the
common-law manslaughter offense. A killing that would otherwise be murder is
reduced to manslaughter when "committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse."56
Intentional killings that the common law reduces to manslaughter also qualify as
manslaughter under the Model Penal Code. But the Model Penal Code provision
significantly enlarges the category of manslaughter by dropping the common law
52 Ashworth, supra note 6, at 293; Dressier, supra note 49, at 426; see MODELPENAL CODE
§ 210.3 cmt. 5, at 57-58 (1980).
53 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 57-58 (1980); LAFAVE& SCOTr, supra note
1, § 7.10(b), at 654-59; Dressier, supra note 49, at 428; Ashworth, supra note 6, at 293.
54 See, eg., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976); PLLSBURY, supra note 13, at
133-34. For instance, at common law the adultery pigeonhole applied only when one spouse
actually witnesses the other spouse committing adultery. Verbal rather than oracular evidence of
marital infidelity was not sufficient provocation. Some courts, however, have broadened the
pigeonhole to encompass one spouse's "suddenly being told of his wife's infidelity." LAFAVE &
ScoTr, supra note 1, § 7.10(b)(5), at 657. In fact, the common law rule that words alone maynot
suffice "has in many jurisdictions changed into a rule that words alone will sometimes do, at least
if the words are informational (conveying information of a fact that constitutes a reasonable
provocation when that fact is observed) rather than merely insulting or abusive words." Id. at 657-
58.
The broadening of the common law pigeonholes blurs somewhat the difference between the
common law and Model Penal Code approaches. As Professor Nourse has said, "Today, we are
only safe in saying that in the law of passion, there lie two poles--one exemplified by the most
liberal [Model Penal Code] reforms and the other by the most traditional categorical view of the
common law. In between these two poles, a majority of states borrow liberally from both
traditions." Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J 1331, 1342 (1997).
55 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); SANFORD H.
KADisH & STFPHEN J. SCHUIHOFER, CR EALLAWAND rrs PRocEssEs: CAsEs AND MATERA LS
812-13 (6th ed. 1995). A defense of self-defense is "imperfect" when the accused honestly but
unreasonably believed that he or she needed to use deadlyforce to repel the imminent infliction
of death or seriously bodily harm by an unlawful aggressor.
56 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980).
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requirements of an immediate provocation,57 an excited emotional state,58 a
provocation that emanates from the victim,59 and a provocation fitting into one of a
few narrow pigeonholes. 60 Whether provoked or not, an extreme emotional or mental
state will suffice so long as some reasonable explanation or excuse exists for it.
Although the new paradigm has clear implications for distinguishing murder
from manslaughter as well as dividing murder into degrees, no jurisdiction yet has
embraced them. First, the new paradigm's underlying approach implies that an array
of mitigating circumstances should be considered in determining whether to classify
an intentional killing as manslaughter rather than murder. It would seem that these
should include most, if not all, of the numerous mitigating circumstances listed in the
Model Penal Code death penalty provision and in death penalty statutes. Existing law,
however, treats an excusable or understandable state of emotional or mental
incapacity, and perhaps imperfect self-defense, as the only mitigating circumstances
relevant to the choice between murder and manslaughter. Second, the new paradigm
implies that aggravating and mitigating circumstances may coexist in any given case
and that both should be considered in deciding the appropriate offense classification.
Existing law, however, reduces an intentional killing based only on the mitigating
circumstances it treats as sufficient and does not permit consideration of any
aggravating circumstances that also happen to be present
In sum, the law of homicide is in the midst of a transition. In determining which
intentional killings are eligible for and warrant the death penalty, jurisdictions have
adopted a new and fundarentally different grading paradigm. This paradigm, which
constitutes an alternative approach of potentially general applicability, makes an
expanded list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant to the grade of the
offense and allows for consideration of both types of circumstances in any given case.
Although it so far has been confined largely to implementation of the death penalty,
57 MODELPENAL CODE. § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 61 (1980).
58 A mental or emotional disturbance not involving anger or excitation will qualify. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.3 cn. 5, at 53-54 (1980).
59 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt 5, at 60-61 (1980).
60 MODELPENALCODE § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 61 (1980).The drafters of the code also broadened
the offense of manslaughter in another way, by giving jurors enormous discretion. The common
law limits the jury's role by specifying just a few provocations as legally adequate. Thejury is not
instructed on the offense of manslaughter unless the facts would permit it to find the existence of
a triggering event on the shortlist of adequate provocations. In contrast, the Code does not define
the capacious phrases of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" or "reasonable explanation
or excuse," which lie at the heart of its formulation. In fact, it provides that, "[tjhe reasonableness
of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." The drafters explained that "[t]he
word 'situation' is designedly ambiguous" and that the ambiguity should be resolved by "the
ordinary citizen in the function ofjuror assigned to resolve the specific case. MODELPENAL CODE
§ 210.3 cmt. 5, at61 (1980).
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its use has been gradually spilling over into other contexts. So far obscured by the
pitched battle over the death penalty, the sea change now brewing in the law of
homicide deserves notice and critical scrutiny.
II. TRADmONAL LAW AND FIRST-DEGREE MURDER
Should the shift from the traditional to the new grading paradigm be resisted or
accelerated? This Part begins an answer by evaluating how traditional law draws the
line between degrees of murder. Under the traditional paradigm, an intentional killing
is classified as first-degree or capital murder only if it was premeditated or committed
in the course of a dangerous felony. This Part has no quarrel with traditional law
insofar as it employs the felony murder rule to elevate an intentional killing from
second to first-degree murder.61 However, this Part does press two fundamental
objections against the traditional way of identifying the most serious intentional
homicides. First, the traditional approach is underinclusive because other aggravating
factors can justify assigning such a killing to the most serious group of homicides.
Second, it is overinclusive both because premeditation sometimes has a mitigating
significance, which traditional law perversely treats as aggravating, and because
premeditation sometimes coexists with mitigating factors that justify assigning the
homicide to a less serious category.
61 In most jurisdictions, the felony murder rule has two principal functions. The first function
is to elevate an intentional (but unpremeditated) killing that would otherwise be second-degree
murder to first-degree murder. As indicated in the text, this first function of the felony murder,
which the new paradigm incorporates by treating contemporaneous commission of a dangerous
felony as an aggravating circumstance, is justifiable. See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A
Rationalefor the Law ofHomicide , 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1271-72 (1937); Givelber, supra
note 13, at 385 (conceding that despite other criticisms of the felony murder rule principled
arguments for this function of rule "may well exist"). Concomitant commission of a felony
dangerous to human life indicates a greater disrespect for human life and therefore adds to the
punishment the offense deserves as a matter of retributive justice. See infra notes 72-73 &
accompanying text for a discussion of a retributivist view of criminal punishment The offender's
willingness to put human life at risk also indicates an increased dangerousness and a greater need
for incapacitation, thereby supporting increased punishment on utilitarian grounds. See infra notes
67-71 & accompanying text for a discussion of utilitarian views of criminal punishment
The second function of the felony murder rule is to elevate to first-degree murder an
unintentional killing that otherwise generally would be classified as a lesser degree of homicide
or not criminal homicide at all. The scholarly literature generally condemns this second function
of the felony murder. See, e.g., II MODELPENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 37 (1980) ("Principled
argument in favor ofthe felony-murder doctrine is hard to find."); Givelber, supra note 13, at 384-
85; George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 413,427-28 (1981). But
see David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.
L. & Pun. POL'Y 359, 361-63 (1985). Because it relates to the classification of unintentional
homicides, this aspect of the felony murder rule is beyond this article's purview.
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In addition to finding clear support in the accepted purposes of criminal
punishment, these criticisms are already implicit in the behavior of American juries
and judges. The problem here, then, lies not so much in changing existing practice
as it does in rationalizing it and closing a cynicism-breeding gap that now exists
between the law on the books and the law in practice.
A. Other Aggravating Factors
Defendant [Anderson] ... had been living for about eight months with a Mrs.
Hammond and her three children, [including] ... the victim Victoria, aged 10.... []e
had been drinking heavily....
... The evidence established that the victim's tom and bloodstained dress had been
ripped from her, that her clothes, including her panties out of which the crotch had been
ripped, were found in various rooms of the house, that there were bloody footprints
matching the size of the victim's leading from the master bedroom to Victoria's room,
and that there was blood in almost every room including the kitchen, the floor of which
appeared to have been mopped.
Over 60 [knife-inflicted] wounds, both severe and superficial, were found on
Victoria's body. The cuts extended over her entire body, including one extending from
the rectum through the vagina, and the partial cutting off of her tongue. Several of the
wounds, including the vaginal lacerations, were post mortern.62
The killing in the gruesome case described above clearly was not premeditated
within the ordinary meaning of that term, which connotes planning.63 The defendant
Anderson was quite drunk. As indicated by the number and the placement of the
wounds, he was gripped by violent sexual impulses. His efforts to conceal the crime
were partial, clumsy, and wholly ineffectual. Taken together, these facts compel the
conclusion that he killed impulsively rather than according to some pre-design. The
California Supreme Court, which assigned "premeditation' its ordinary meaning,
accordingly held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict
of first-degree murder.64
Although the killing was impulsive rather than planned, it possessed a number
of aggravating features. First, the victim was a vulnerable and entirely innocent ten-
62 People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942,944, 945 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
63The dictionary definition of "premeditation" is "consideration or planning of an act
beforehand." MERRAM WEBSE'S COu.EGIATEDICrONARY 919 (10th ed. 1993); see also ROLuN
M. PERKINS, CRMINAL LAw 92 (2d ed. 1969); ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT:
1949-1953 174 n.8 (1953) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION].
64 The California Supreme Court also held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
the defendant had committed first-degree felony murder because the evidence that the defendant
had committed a felonious sex offense was lacking. Anderson, 447 P.2d at 953-55.
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year-old child. Second, Anderson, who had been living in the household for some
eight months with the child's mother, apparently occupied a quasi-parental role
respecting the child victim. Third, the evidence of a struggle and the extreme brutality
of the killing indicate a callous and inhuman indifference to the child's suffering.
Fourth, the manner of the killing suggests that Anderson wished to abuse the child to
satisfy his own selfish appetite for sex and/or violence. These aggravating factors-
the vulnerability of the victim, the killer's duty of care to the victim, the extreme
brutality of the killing, and the attempted sexual abuse of the victim-lend
overwhelming support to the jury's decision to put the killing in the most serious
offense category.
Cases such as Anderson unfortunately are not an aberration. It is not difficult to
find cases in which the killing was unplanned but involved aggravating circumstances
such as a vulnerable victim, a parental relationship between the killer and the victim,
or extreme cruelty.65 As Anderson illustrates, it makes very little sense in such cases
to focus only on the absence of planning, treating it as a circumstance that mitigates
murder from first to second-degree, while categorically ignoring the presence of
numerous other aggravating factors. As Professor Fletcher has written, "Where is
obviously a flaw in the criterion of 'premeditation and deliberation.' It takes one of
several grounds that are sufficient to treat a homicide as among the most wicked, and
takes that one ground to be necessary to the exclusion of all others."66
The accepted purposes of criminal punishment bolster the conclusion that a
broader range of aggravating circumstances should be taken into account Consider
first the utilitarian view of criminal punishment, which sees the criminal process as
a tool for achieving beneficial future consequences through general and specific
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 67 From a utilitarian view, it is not clear
that premeditation has a strongly aggravating significance. It is said that deterrence
supports an increased penalty for premeditated killings on the ground that those who
deliberate beforehand might include the added penalty in their deliberative calculus
and be deterred by it.68 However, it seems doubtful that the marginal influence of an
65 For instance, Anderson is just one of many cases in which a person occupying a parental
role brutally killed a vulnerable child, the jury understandably returned a verdict of first-degree
murder, and an appellate court overturned the verdict on the ground that evidence of premeditation
is lacking. See also Midgett v. State, 729 S.W.2d 410, 411, 415 (Ark 1987) (father killed his eight-
year-old son by brutally and repeatedly beating him); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 457,
463 (Va. 1946); People v. Ingraharn, 133 N.E. 575, 576-77 (N. Y. 1921); H.D. Warren,
Annotation, CriminalLiabilityforExcessive or Improper Punishment Inflicted on Child by Parent,
Teacher, or One in Loco Parentis, 89 A.L.R. 2d 396,417-18 (1963) (discussing Ingraham and
Panni).
6 6 GEORGE LErCHR, RmHicNG CJMJNAL LAW 254 (1978).
67 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 1336, 1340-41.
6 8 See State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163,181 (W.Va. 1995); Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d
129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Givelber, supra note 13, at 384.
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increased penalty will be very great Will many offenders really reason that a killing
is worth committing if the expected penalty is, say, only fifteen years instead of
twenty-five?69
More important, even if deterrence does support an increased penalty for
premeditated killings, the need for incapacitation can justify also putting impulsive
killings in the most serious offense category. Those who have violent impulses they
cannot control pose special dangers and stand in need of lengthy incapacitation,
particularly when, as in Anderson, they are grossly insensitive to the interests of
others. As the drafters of Model Penal Code famously declared, "[the suddenness of
the killing may simply reveal callousness so complete and depravity so extreme that
no hesitation is required.'7°
As it is now employed, the new paradigm uses several aggravating circumstances
that indirectly measure the need for incapacitation. Typical aggravating circumstances
include the infliction of exceptional cruelty, the youth or vulnerability of the victim,
knowing creation of great risk of death to many persons, and previous conviction of
violent felonies.71 The presence of one or more of these circumstances tends to
indicate a greater need for incapacitation because the defendant has unusually strong
violent impulses, is unable to control those impulses, or is unusually insensitive to the
interests of others. Anderson exemplifies a case in which aggravating circumstances
such as these strongly evidence a need for incapacitation that justifies putting an
impulsive killing in the most serious offense category. The utilitarian school of
thought, which includes considerations of incapacitation as well as general deterrence,
does not support punishing premeditated killings more harshly as a category than
impulsive ones.
Nor does retributivism, the other main school of thought about purposes of
criminal punishment, support punishing premeditated killings more harshly.72
Retributivism seeks to punish the offender according to the moral wrongfulness of his
act regardless of any future benefits and costs flowing from the punishment Under
the retributivist view, which derives from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the
wrongfulness of an act is measured by the degree to which it fails to accord proper
69 Cf Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases ofthe
Casefor CapitalPunishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1192 (1981) (making a similar point about
the deterrent effect of the death penalty versus life imprisonment).
70 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.6 crat. 4(b), at 127 (1980).
71 See supra notes 37 and 39.
72 According to Professor Dolinko, "retributivism, once treated as an irrational vestige of
benighted times, has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded
today as the leading philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment" David
Dolinko, Three Mistakes ofRetributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992).
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respect to others.73 As the facts of Anderson powerfully illustrate, impulsive as well
as premeditated killings can evidence the highest degree of disrespect for others.74 In
stabbing the victim repeatedly and chasing her around the house, Anderson
demonstrated cruel insensitivity to her suffering. In killing, torturing, and seeking to
abuse her, he gave absolute priority to gratification of his own violent and sexual
impulses and no weight at all to her interests. Judged from the standpoint of
retributivisn, the new paradigm is right to rely on aggravating circumstances such as
the torture of victim or knowing exposure of a great number of persons to a risk of
death. Such aggravating circumstances constitute relevant measures of the degree of
a killer's disrespect for the interests of others.
Reliance on aggravating circumstances other than premeditation also squares
with the limited evidence concerning the moral judgments ofjurors.75 The Capital
Juror Project in South Carolina 76 asked jurors who sat in forty-one capital murder
cases to identify which aggravating and mitigating circumstances they did or would
find most persuasive in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The interviews
revealed that the jurors regarded extreme brutality and the status of the victim as a
child as, by far, the most important aggravating circumstances. 77 By contrast, the
73 See Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 1338; Michael Moore, The Moral Worth ofRetribution,
in RESPONSIBILIY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONs: NZw ESSAYs IN MORAL PsYCHOLOGY 179,
180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (explaining that retributivists are "committed to the principle
that punishment should be graded in proportion to [moral culpability]').
74 Professor Pillsbury observes that "the [Anderson] case leads us to doubt whether an
impassioned decision to kill is necessarily less culpable than a dispassionate one." PILLSBURY,
supra note 13, at 104. However, a serious deficiencyin his own proposal forreform is that it is not
at all clear that the Anderson killing qualifies as a case of aggravated murder. That proposal defines
the most serious category as "the purposeful killing of another human being for profit, to further
a criminal endeavor, to affect public policy or legal processes, because of animosity toward the
victim's race, religion, ethnicity, sex or sexual orientation, or to assert cruel power over another."
Id. at 110. The only aggravating motive that potentially applies on the facts of Anderson is the
assertion of cruel power over another. No doubt it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove
and the jury to find that Anderson was motivated by a desire to assert cruel power over another.
It is quite doubtful that Anderson himself understood his motivations. More to the point, one does
not need to understand Anderson's subjective motivation to appreciate the strong retributivist and
utilitarian justifications for putting his killing in the most serious offense category. Whatever his
motivation, he demonstrated gross insensitivity to the interests of others as well as a great potential
for future dangerousness.
75 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation andMitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998).
7 6 The Project is "a National Science Foundation-funded multistate research effort." Id. at
1539; see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L. J. 1043, 1077-85 (1995) (examining a multidisciplinary study of how jurors
make their life or death sentencing decisions).
7 7 Garvey, supra note 75, at 1555-56; see also DAVID C. BALDUS ETIAL, EQUALJUSnCE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY 56 (1990) (reporting a study of Georgia death penalty cases revealing that
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presence or absence of premeditation had a very equivocal impact on the jurors. In
fact, the jurors who reported that, like traditional law, they regarded the absence of
premeditation as mitigating were outnumbered by the jurors who regarded a killing's
impulsivity as aggravating.78
These views bolster the case for adopting legal standards that accommodate
aggravating circumstances other than premeditation. It is true that legal standards
need and should not slavishly follow the sentiments of jurors. But, given that a
principal purpose of the criminal jury is to help assure that the exercise of
governmental coercion comports with basic community values,79 their views deserve
some general deference.80 Here, juror views harmonize rather than conflict with the
purposes of criminal punishment, as strong retributive and utilitarian reasons exist for
treating extreme brutality and the victim's youth as aggravating circumstances.81 The
argument for deferring to such views is compelling.
extreme brutality and commission during a contemporaneous felony were the factors that most
often resulted in death penalty); McCord, supra note 13, at 583 (finding that of the twenty-five
then most recent Georgia cases in which the defendant had been sentenced to death, fifteen
involved a particularly repulsive method of killing).
78 Garvey, supra note 75, at 1555 (noting that thirty-seven percent of jurors said that the
absence of premeditation did or would have no influence on their decision).
79 See, eg., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155-56 (1968); HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THEAMEICAN JuRY 498 (1966).
80 See PAULIL ROBINSON& JOHNM. DAR.EY, JusTIcE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNniY
Vmws AND THE CRmiNAL LAW 6 (1995).
81 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is worth noting that
influential law reform commissions in both the United States and Great Britain have recommended
against defining the most serious category of intentional murders based on premeditation.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the judgment that"the person who plans ahead
is worse than the person who kills on sudden impulse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980).
In 1949, a Royal Commission in Great Britain reached the same conclusion. It unanimously
rejected a proposal to divide murder into degrees based on the presence or absence of
premeditation. According to the Commission, "a sudden killing may be the direct expression of
an incorrigibly vicious nature, while a premeditated and deliberate murder maybe among the most
excusable." ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 63, at 175. Defining first-degree murder in terms of
premeditation is "at once too wide' because some premeditated murders are accompanied by
important mitigating factors "and too narrow" because some unpremeditated murders "'involve
even more diabolical cruelty and ferocity."' Id. (quoting 3. STEP-EN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 94 (1883)).
A few years after publication of the Royal Commission's report, Parliament enacted the
Homicide Act. The Act defined the most serious category of murders in terms of several
aggravating factors. The death penalty, which has since been abolished, was reserved for murders
committed (a) in the course of or furtherance of theft; (b) by shooting or causing an explosion;
(c) while resisting, avoiding or preventing arrest or escape from lawful custody, (d) against a police
officer, (e) by a prisoner killing a prison officer, or (f) by one who had been convicted of murder
on a different occasion. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 §§ 5-6 (Eng.); see D.W. Elliot,
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To a surprising degree, existing law implicitly accepts the conclusions that
aggravating circumstances other than premeditation ought to influence the grade of
the offense and that the traditional paradigm arbitrarily overlooks such circumstances.
Although a majority of state homicide statutes define first-degree murder in terms of
premeditation,82 appellate courts in a great many ofthese jurisdictions decline to give
premeditation its ordinary meaning of planning.83 They either allow trial courts to
instruct juries in ways that eliminate the term's significance or uphold convictions for
premeditated murder in the absence of genuine evidence of planning.84 Such
The HomicideAct, 1957, 1957 CRm. L. REv. 282,288-90 (1957). Premeditation was not included
in the list of aggravating factors that define the most serious class of murders.
82 See supra note 20.
83 See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, 638 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (noting the
'"nore widespread judicial tendency" of interpreting premeditation and deliberation not to "call for
elements that the word[s] normally signif[y]"); PERKINS, supra note 63, at 92; Brenner, supra note
3, at 280 ('ro an alarming extent... the courts have not given these words ['deliberate and
premeditated'] their literal meaning."); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (1994) (commentary) ('Often a
finding of a conscious intent to kill is deemed sufficient for, or indistinguishably close to,
premleditation and deliberation.").
84 At one extreme end of the spectrum, the meaning of "premeditation" has been equated
with "intentional" so that there is no meaningful analytical distinction between a premeditated
intentional killing, which is first-degree murder, and an unpremeditated intentional murder, which
is second-degree murder. In State v. Schrader, 302 S.E12d 70,75 (W. Va. 1982), the West Virginia
Supreme Court declared that "the meaning of 'premeditated' as used in the statute was [and is]
essentially 'knowing' and 'intentional."' The Schrader court followed early decisions in
Pennsylvania and Virginia to the same effect and quoted with approval Justice Cardozo's oft-
repeated statement that "what we have is merely a privilege offered to the juryto find the lesser
degree when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly
for the exercise of mercy."' Id (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, hat Medicine Can Do For Law,
in LAW AND LrIERATuRE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 70, 100 (1931)). But see State v.
Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 182 (W. Va. 1995) (overruling Schrader insofar as it equates
"premeditation" with mere intent).
Consistent with the West Virginia Supreme Court's explicit holding in Schrader, many
jurisdictions do not require that any appreciable time elapse between the formation and the
execution of the intent to kill. See, e.g., S.D. CODmD LAws §22-16-5 (Michie 1998);
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911,916 (Pa. 1963); Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117, 122
(Colo. 1961); Jackson v. State, 202 S.W. 683 (Ark. 1918); LAFAVE & SCowt, supra note 1,
§ 7.7(a), at 643 n.8; Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules Requiring Malice
"Aforethought, " "Deliberation, " or "Premeditation, "As Elements ofMurder in the Fit-dgree,
18 A.L.R.4th 961 (1982) (listing cases holding that no particular time need elapse for
premeditation to exist). As Professor Perkins has observed, such an interpretation tends to equate
"premeditated with "intended":
Those who first employed this word in this type of first-degree murder statute undoubtedly had in
mind a malicious scheme thought out well in advance of the fatal act itself. And unless we are
willing to ignore the plain meaning of words we are forced to recognize that a fatal act might be
intentional and yet entirely too hasty to be deliberate and premeditated. The notion that a fully-
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definitional legerdemain is sometimes attributed to inherent vagueness in the concept
of premeditation.85 However, the concept of planning is neither vague nor difficult.
Dictionaries clearly define "premeditation" and scholars have no great difficulty with
the distinction between a planned and unplanned intent to kill. 8 6 Despite occasional
protestations to the contrary, it should be clear that many courts are diluting the
statute's plain meaning.87
The best explanation for this widespread practice is discomfort with the
conclusion that premeditation is the sine qua non of killings that deserve the most
severe punishment Courts thus give the jury "unstructured discretion ''88 to
distinguish between first and second-degree intentional murders. This has the
advantage of allowing classification decisions to take implicit account of other
aggravating circumstances, which at least arguably is what legislatures intended
anyway.89 But the reduction of premeditation and deliberation to a "mystifying cloud
formed intent is always deliberate and premeditated, no matter how short the time between the first
thought of the matter and the execution of the plan, is preposterous. And yet some courts have
taken just such a position.
PERKINs, supra note 63, at 92; see also Mathew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM.
CitM. L. REv. 145, 154-55 (1999); Brenner, supra note 3, at 280-85.
85 Some courts quote Cardozo for the proposition that the premeditation criterion is
hopelessly vague. See, ag., Schrader, 302 SB.2d at 75. But if it is meant to suggest that Cardozo
thought that the term "premeditation" itself is unduly vague, the quote is taken out of context.
Cardozo did write that the "distinction [between premeditated and unpremeditated intent] is
too vague to be continued in our law" and that 'I am not at all sure that I understand it myself after
trying to applyit for many years." Cardozo, supra note 84, at 99, 101. But he was speaking ofthe
meaning of premeditated and deliberate as those phrases had been defined by judicial decisions.
Those decisions, he observed, "ha[ve] given to these words a meaning that differs to some extent
from the one revealed upon the surface" of the statute. Id. at 97. He was referring, in particular, to
decisions holding that an intent to kill may be premeditated and deliberate without "any particular
length oftime... interven[ing] between the volition and act," id at 98, and that "seconds maybe
enough" Id.
For Cardozo, then, the vagueness problem arose not from indefiniteness in the ordinary
meaning of premeditation but rather from judicial dilution of that meaning.
86 Seesupra note 63.
87 FErCHER, supra note 66, § 4.23, at 254-55; LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 1, § 7.7(a), at
643; PERKNS, supra note 63, at 92; Brenner, supra note 3, at 280.
88 People v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d 434,447 (Mich. App. 1971); see also Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d
at 181 n.22.
89 It seems quite doubtful that in enacting murder statutes legislatures focused squarely on
whether an unpremeditated intentional homicide might deserve to be placed in the most serious
category of murder based on other aggravating factors. It they had done so, they at least arguably
would have concluded that some such homicides do deserve the most serious offense category.
This conclusion creates a tension between the statute's literal language, which focuses on
premeditation, and its overriding purpose of classifying intentional homicides according to their
seriousness. A court legitimately could resolve this tension in favor of statutory purpose, giving
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of words"90 has the disqualifying disadvantages of breeding disrespect for statutory
language91 and of giving jurors unguided discretion.
The new paradigm reflects a better approach. It explicitly allows aggravating
circumstances other than premeditation to be taken into account. Rather than giving
jurors uncabined discretion, it hinges grading decisions on aggravating circumstances
specified by statute. In so doing, it involves legislatures in the grading process, better
promotes consistency of decisions and respect for statutory language, and more
effectively reflects the purposes of criminal punishment and the moral sensibilities of
jurors.
B. Other Mitigating Factors
Consider the facts of State v. Forest:
Defendant's father, who had previously been hospitalized, was suffering from
numerous serious ailments, including severe heart disease, hypertension, a thoracic
aneurysm, numerous pulmonary emboli, and a peptic ulcer. By the morning of December
23, 1985, his medical condition was determined to be untreatable and terminal.
Accordingly, he was classified as "No Code," meaning that no extraordinary measures
would be used to save his life ....
On 24 December 1985, defendant went to the hospital to visit his ailing father.
Alone at his father's bedside, defendant began to cry and to tell his father how much he
loved him. His father began to cough, emitting a gurgling and rattling noise. Extremely
upset, defendant pulled a small pistol from his pants pocket, put itto his father's temple,
and fired. He subsequently fired three more times and walked out in the hospital corridor,
dropping the gun to the floor just outside his father's room.92
This tragic case reveals another kind of error associated with traditional legal
classification of intentional homicides. In addition to overlooking important
aggravating factors, the traditional paradigm fails to appreciate that compelling
mitigating circumstances sometimes accompany premeditation and that premeditation
itself sometimes possesses mitigating significance.
jurors the freedom to characterize unplanned intentional homicides as first-degree murder based
on aggravating factors other than premeditation.
90 CARDOZO, supra note 84, at 100.
91 It would be one thing if these decisions said openly that, based on the tension between the
purpose of the first-degree murder statute and its literal language, courts are justified in departing
from that language. But instead of openly acknowledging their departure, courts purport to
interpret "premeditation" faithfully. The simultaneous departure from the text and the pretense of
following it carry the troubling messages that courts are not bound by statutory text and that
insincerity is an acceptable feature ofjudicial reasoning.
92 362 S.E.2d 252,253-54 (N.C. 1987).
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The reported facts, though not entirely unequivocal, indicate that Forest did
"premeditate" the killing. Having learned of his father's hopeless diagnosis the day
before, he had a prior motive to kill 93 and an opportunity for reflection. Further,
Forest carried a concealed pistol into the hospital, demonstrating that he had planned
the killing.94 Planning is also evidenced by Forest telling his father how much he
loved him and crying immediately before the killing. The North Carolina Supreme
Court accordingly upheld the jury's verdict of first-degree premeditated murder.
By putting the Forest killing into the most serious offense category based on
premeditation, the traditional paradigm ignores at least two compelling mitigating
circumstances. First, the reported facts raise an inference that Forest, who loved his
father, held a sincere belief that the killing was in his father's best interests. This
contrasts quite sharply with Anderson, where the defendant displayed extreme
indifference to the interests of his ten-year-old victim by trying to sexually abuse her
and repeatedly slashing her with a machete as he chased her around the house.95
Second, in Forest the premeditation was itself a mitigating factor. Forest's reflection
on whether to kill his father, as well as his crying before and aflter the killing, indicate
moral anguish. Had he killed unhesitatingly and without reflection, the killing would
have been more reprehensible because of its callous insensitivity to the value of life.
The purposes of criminal punishment reinforce the conclusion that premeditated
killings like those in Forest do not belong in the most serious offense category. From
a retributivist perspective, Forest's premeditated mercy killing of his father constituted
a qualitatively less serious infiringement of autonomy than did Anderson's
unpremeditated but brutal killing of the child with whom he shared the household.
Forest believed-correctly, it appears--that his father had permanently lost all
autonomy. He had grounds for believing not only that the killing did not violate his
father's nonexistent autonomy, but also that perhaps the killing was consistent with
respect for his father's autonomy. In light of his father's dire medical prognosis,
Forest apparently concluded that the killing was in his father's best interests and,
perhaps, that his father would have chosen to die had he been able to make the
choice. 96 In sharp contrast, Anderson's killing cannot conceivably be seen as
93 In jurisdictions such as California, which give "premeditation" its ordinary meaning of
planning, evidence of a prior motive to kill is relevant evidence of premeditation. See People v.
Anderson, 447 P.2d 942,949 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
94 See, ag., United States v. Brooks, 449 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that
bringing a deadly weapon to the scene of the crime is relevant evidence of premeditation); State
v. Henson, 562 P.2d 51, 56 (Kan. 1977) (holding that the use of a deadly weapon is one
circumstance to be considered to infer deliberation) (citing State v. Hamilton, 534 P.2d 226,232
(Kan. 1975)).
95 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
96 For arguments that voluntary euthanasia can be consistent with and is perhaps required by
respect for individual autonomy, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMION 190-92,
213 (1993).
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consistent with his victim's autonomy. An offense classification sensitive to
retributivist concerns would reflect the obvious conclusion that unpremeditated
killings such as those in Anderson are worse and more deserving of punishment than
premeditated killings such as those in Forest.
Utilitarian considerations produce a similar result In contrast with Anderson,
whose impulsivity and brutality strongly suggested a need for incapacitation, Forest
hardly can be viewed as posing great dangers to others unless incarcerated. One might
argue that persons who premeditate, as Forest did, are more likely to be deterred by
the threat of criminal sanctions.97 Still, even assuming that an increased penalty for
premeditated killing has some deterrent effect, it does not follow that premeditated
killings such as that in Forest should be punished more severely than the Anderson
killing. It would seem that the social harm caused by the Anderson killing and the
need to deter that harm were far greater than in Forest. In addition, there is no reason
to believe that an increased interest in deterrence will always predominate over the
reduced need for incapacitation suggested by mitigating factors such as those in
Forest. Conversely, there is no reason to believe that any reduced interest in
deterrence which flows from a killer's impulsivity will predominate over the
increased need for incapacitation suggested by aggravating factors such as those
present in Anderson.
The new paradigm avoids the serious flaws in the traditional approach
highlighted by cases such as Anderson and Forest. Used as a basis for grading
homicides generally, the new paradigm would change the unacceptable outcome in
Anderson by permitting consideration of a fuller range of aggravating circumstances.
It would likewise permit a different result in Forest. In contrast with the traditional
paradigm's categorical approach, the statutes embodying the new paradigm treat
premeditation as an aggravating circumstance only when it indicates an unusually
extreme and blatant exaltation of the killer's interest and devaluation of the victim's
interests, as when the killing was for hire or was otherwise committed for pecuniary
gain.98 The purposes of criminal punishment, the practices of courts and jurors, and
cases such as Anderson and Forest all strongly suggest that the new paradigm
provides a better analytical framework for identifying the most serious intentional
homicides.
III. TRADITIONAL LAW AND MANSLAUGHTER
This Part tums its attention to the line between murder and manslaughter. Under
the traditional grading paradigm, an excusable emotional or mental disturbance
suffices to place an intentional homicide into the least serious offense category. 99
97 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
98 See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
99 See supra Part I.B.
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Under the common law approach embraced by most modem American jurisdictions,
an intentional killing that would otherwise count as murder is reduced to
manslaughter when the perpetrator was in the throes of a passion precipitated by some
"adequate" provocation. The Model Penal Code formulation, which a substantial
minority of states accept, expands the circumstances in which an unlawful intentional
killing may be reduced from murder to manslaughter. It provides that an unlawful
intentional killing becomes manslaughter if "committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation
or excuse."
100
Each of these formulations suffers from shortcomings that mirror those of first-
degree premeditated murder, discussed previously. The focus is on only one
consideration, while other aggravating and mitigating considerations of equal or
greater significance are ignored. This unduly narrow focus produces indefensible
results, often in cases involving intra-familial violence. In its structure, if not its
content, the new grading paradigm promises to do better.
A. Mitigation
Two cases help illustrate that traditional doctrines of mitigation are both too
broad and too narrow. Consider first the facts of Commonwealth v. Schnopps. 101 Six
months before the killing, the defendant's wife had told him that she did not love him
anymore and wanted a divorce. Three weeks before the killing, the defendant,
Schnopps, had confirmed his suspicions that his wife was seeing another man, and
his wife moved out of the house.10 2
Schnopps [went to where his wife was living] asked [her] to come to their home and talk
over their rnarital difficulties. Schnopps told his wife that he wanted his children at home,
and that he wanted the family to remain intact Schnopps cried during the conversation,
and begged his wife to let the children live with him and to keep their family together.
His wife replied, "No, I am going to court, you are going to give me all the furniture, you
are going to have to get the Hell out of here, you won't have nothing." Then, pointing to
her crotch, she said, "You will never touch this again, because I have got something
bigger and better for it"
100 § 210.3(l)(b). For a discussion of both the common law and Model Penal Code
approaches, see supra Part I.B.
101 417 N.E. 2d 1213 (Mass. 1981).
102 I at 1215.
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On hearing those words, Schnopps claims that his mind went blank, and that he went
"berserk." He went to a cabinet and got out a pistol he had bought and loaded the day
before, and he shot his wife and himself.103
Now consider The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens.104 Four shipwrecked crewmen,
including defendants Dudley and Stephens, had been in a lifeboat for nineteen days
and had eaten nothing for eight days.10 5 Dudley and Stephens discussed killing the
youngest, who was in a much weaker state than the other three. 0 6 They put off the
killing, hoping to be rescued.107 When no vessel was in sight the next day and they
felt themselves on the verge of starvation, the two killed the youngest, and the
remaining three fed upon his body for four days until they were rescued.108 The jury
found that unless the youngest had been killed, there was no appreciable chance that
any of the others would have survived until their rescue four days later.109
As these two cases illustrate, the traditional paradigm is both overinclusive and
underinclusive in identifying mitigating factors that may reduce murder to
manslaughter. It mitigates murder to manslaughter based on circumstances lacking
real mitigating significance. The Massachusetts Supreme Court treated the killing in
Schnopps as an appropriate candidate for manslaughter because Schnopps was
reminded of his wife's "infidelity." 0 The Court so held even though the victim had
ended the relationship weeks before, had repeatedly refused to reconcile, had moved
out of their house, and was in the process of securing a divorce. 111 In addition to
relying upon dubious mitigating circumstances such as these, existing law takes no
cognizance of far more powerful mitigating circumstances. For example, under the
traditional paradigm, the life-boat killing in Dudley & Stephens is a classic case of
first-degree premeditated murder and could not be a candidate for manslaughter even
though the jury found the killing necessary to save three lives.
103 Id. On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the
possible heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter verdict. Id. at 1216.
104 14 Q.B.D. 273,273-74 (1884).




10 9 Id. at 275.
110 Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 417 N.E. 2d 1213, 1216 (Mass. 1981).
111 Id. at 1215-16.
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1. Overinclusivity
The provocations the common law recognizes as adequate to excuse passion and
to reduce murder to manslaughter trace back to an earlier era. Several are now of very
questionable mitigating significance. For instance, the common law rule that mutual
combat or brawling constituted adequate provocation reflects the notion that physical
violence, including dueling to the death, is an understandable and excusable way to
defend against afflonts to one's personal honor.112 This notion, however, has
weakened considerably as reflected by the duty to retreat, which many jurisdictions
now impose before a person may use deadly force in self-defense. 113
The common law rule that witnessing a spouse's infidelity constitutes adequate
provocation' 14 seems similarly outmoded. A retributivist rationale can be seen at
work in the common law rules governing which provocations may reduce murder to
manslaughter. Common law courts recognized as adequate only those provocations
that, at the time, constituted serious legal wrongs. From a retributivist view, the
wrongfulness of the victim's conduct serves partially to justify the killing and to
diminish the inherent wrongfulness of the defendant's act.11 5 While adultery was
regarded as a serious legal wrong when the common law rule treating it as adequate
provocation first developed," 6 it is no longer so regarded. Even where legal
proscriptions against adultery remain, they are no longer enforced.11 7 In addition, in
some cases, such as Schnopps, the defendant who kills an adulterous spouse is killing
a parent of his or her children and/or has failed to respect the spouse's legal right to
divorce and to change intimate partners. As argued below, such circumstances ought
to be treated as aggravating, not mitigating."l 8 In contemporary circumstances, no
112 See Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904); State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309,
318 (Tenn. 1987); JEREMY HORDER, PR VOCATION AND RESPONSImI 27-30 (1992); Bernard
J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a Defence to
Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGALHISTORY 310,312 (1963); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment,
Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1684 n.30 (1986) ("The earliest manslaughter law developed to mitigate
punishment when a killing resulted from a 'chance medley' (sudden brawl) common during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries").
113 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 1, § 5.7(f).
114 Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 n.1 (1707). For the history of the adultery
pigeonhole's roots in archaic notions of property and male prerogatives, see LAwRENcE M.
FREDMAND, CRaM AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISrORY 221-22 (1993). Until the twentieth
century, "only husbands could invoke the defense of provocation when they killed after witnessing
adultery." Taylor, supra note 112, at 1694.
115 See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 6, at 307-08; Dressier, supra note 49, at 438-41.
11 6 Ashworth, supra note 6, at 294.
117 RicHARD A. POSNER,, SExAND REAsON 260-61 (1992).
118 See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text
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strong retibutivist argument remains for continuing to treat the discovery of spousal
infidelity as adequate provocation, at least not in every case.
Consider Schnopps. Schnopps's wife became involved with another man,
declared that she no longer loved Schnopps, announced her intention to divorce him,
and moved out of the home. 119 Despite the passage of several weeks, during which
Schnopps discussed divorce with his own attorney, Schnopps had difficulty
respecting his wife's right to divorce him and to choose another intimate partner.1 20
By killing his wife, Schnopps also violated his obligations to his children by
permanently depriving them of their mother, with whom they had been living since
the parties' separation.
In these circumstances, it seems impossible to defend the conclusion that the
moral wrongfulness of Schnopps' act and the punishment he deserves as a matter of
justice is among those of the least serious intentional killings. It is not at all clear that
Schnopps's wife committed any wrong against him, much less a serious one. Such
a conclusion presupposes that, contrary to existing practice, adultery is a serious legal
wrong and that a married person who has moved into a separate household and is
filing for divorce retains an undiminished obligation of marital fidelity until the
divorce becomes final. Even if one indulges these questionable assumptions and
concludes that the victim violated serious family obligations, a retnbutivist also would
want to take account of the obligations Schnopps had violated. By killing his wife, he
deprived his children of their mother. In fact, given the term of imprisonment he
would have to serve, he deprived them of having any custodial parent during most,
ifnot all, oftheir childhood. In addition, if Schnopps was upset because his wife was
ending the relationship and not just because she pursued another intimate relationship
without waiting until the divorce became final, he refused to respect her moral and
legal right to end the relationship. The moral calculus ofretributivism cannot justify
putting the Schnopps killing into the least serious offense category.
Utilitarian considerations are no more capable than retributive ones ofjustifying
the traditional treatment of adultery. Given that adultery is not an uncommon
phenomenon, 121 someone who tends to react to adultery with lethal violence might
well pose future dangers and need incapacitation. 122 The incidence of adultery also
strengthens the need for general deterrence. Of course, in cases of heat of passion the
119 Coimonwealth v. Schnopps, 417 N.E. 2d 1213, 1215 (Mass. 1981).
120 Id.
121 See TOM W. SMrrH, NAT'L OPINION RES. CENTER, AMERICAN SEXUAL BEHAvIOR:
TRENDs, SOCiO-DEMOGRAPHiC DIFFERENCEs, AND RisK BEHAVIOR 7 (1996), available at
http//purl.ocle.orgnorc/dib/sex.pdf (finding that 15-17% ofmaried persons have had an extra-
marital affair); George W. Bamard et al., Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10
Bu. AM. AcAD. PsYcHiATRY & L 271,274 tl2 (1982) (noting that approximately 60% ofmen
who kill their wives allege that she was sexually unfaithful).
122 See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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killer does not rationally weigh costs and benefits beforehand so that an increased
penalty can change the deliberative outcome. But to the extent the law communicates
messages that exert a subconscious tug, 2 3 the adultery pigeonhole communicates
precisely the wrong message and "removes an important incentive for persons-
primarily men-4o learn self-control." 124 Thus, the common law adultery rule cannot
be explained persuasively on the basis of a reduced need for either incapacitation or
deterrence.
Finally, treating the discovery of adultery as a mitigating factor sufficient to
reduce murder to manslaughter raises problems of gender equity that both a
retributivist and a utilitarian must take seriously.125 At early common law, the
adultery pigeonhole apparently was invoked exclusively by men and until the
twentieth century it was unclear whether women could claim its benefit1 26 Although
now framed in gender neutral terms, the adultery defense still is invoked almost
exclusively by men who have killed their wives.127 The inequity is exacerbated by the
great difficulty that battered women who kill abusive husbands have in convincing
courts to instruct juries on self-defense and/or manslaughter.12 8 In many jurisdictions,
123 See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
124 Joshua DressIer, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "'Reasonable Man " Standard, 85 . CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOoY 726,736 (1995).
12 5 Numerous commentators have sharply criticized the rules that define manslaughter for
gender bias. See HORDER, supra note 112, at 192-94; Donna K. Coker, Heat ofPassion and Tife
Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 78 (1992);
Dressier, supra note 124, at 735-36; Deborah E. Milgate, Note, The Flame Flickers, but Burns
On: Modern Judicial Application of the Ancient Heat ofPassion Defense, 51 RUrGEms L. REv.
193, 194-95 (1998); Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of
Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU. L. Rav. 1507, 1546-48 (1996);
Taylor, supra note 112, at 1689-92.
126 See KAPLAN, ETAL., supra note 2, at 392; Taylor, supra note 112, at 1694.
127 HORDER, supra note 112, at 186-87; see also Taylor, supra note 112, at 1697 ("Cases
and social studies show that women rarelyreactto their husband's infidelity with deadly violence?'
(citations omitted)).
128 HORDEI, supra note 112, at 188-90; Milgate, supra note 125, at 194-95; Taylor, supra
note 112, at 1697-1720.
In some cases, such as those in which an abuser is killed while sleeping, battered women have
difficulty invoking the defense of self-defense because when she killed, the threatened harm
arguably was not "imminent." See State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (holding that harm
was not imminent as a matter of law when abused woman killed her sleeping husband); State v.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (same).
Heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter can be problematic in such cases for much the same
reason. The time between the provocation and killing must not be such that either the killer's
passion has cooled or that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have had time for her
passion to cool. Unless threatened with immediate harm, battered women might be deemed to have
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then, the law treats as a mitigating circumstance the victim's adultery, which the law
no longer punishes, but not prolonged physical or sexual abuse of the killer by the
victim, which often amount to serious felonies. Even if this disparate treatment of
adultery and abuse does not have gender discrimination as its purpose, it does
unjustifiably impose a disproportionate burden on women.
Even though the justifications for the common law adultery pigeonhole have
grown weaker, the modem trend anomalously has been in the direction of expanding
the pigeonhole.129 A number ofjurisdictions have relaxed the common law rule that
the killer actually witness his spouse in the act of infidelity.130 As in Schnopps, these
jurisdictions treat the killer's being told of the infidelity as sufficient. The Model
Penal Code's version ofmanslaughter131 likewise does not require "ocular evidence
of actual adultery"' 32 and broadens the adultery pigeonhole still further. Unlike the
common law, the Model Penal Code requires neither a marital relationship nor a
significant lapse of time between the adultery's discovery and the killing. It permits
ajury to find a "reasonable excuse or explanation" even when a few days prior to the
killing the killer began to suspect that a former girlfiiend had been unfaithful. 133
In fact, the Model Penal Code does not even require sexual infidelity. One court,
for instance, instructed the jury on manslaughter based on the defendant's having
cooled or to have had a reasonable time in which to cool. See Nourse, supra note 54, at 1367 n.226
(citing cases). In addition, some women "appear to have acted in the face of recent provocation,
but with more or less deliberation at or close to the moment of fact" and thus cannot qualify for
heat-of-passion manslaughter because they were not in the throes of passion when they killed.
HORDER, supra note 112, at 188, 190 n.25; Milgate, supra note 125, at 213-18.
There is an extensive literature on whether and to what extent abused spouses can and should
be able to invoke the doctrines of self-defense or heat-of-passion and on the admissibility of
evidence of the so-called "battered woman syndrome." See, e.g., CYINIA Ga.mPm, JusrABLE
HOMICIDE: BATERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAw (1989); Charles Patrick Ewing,
Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed Jusification for Battered Women ho Kill, 14 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1990); Taylor, supra note 112, at 1704-35; Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered
Women Syn drome Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, U. IuL
L. REV. 45 (1994).
129But see MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 387A (Supp. 1998) (abolishing the adultery
pigeonhole).
130 See State v. Auchenbach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 815-16 (Minn. 1995) (instructing thejury on
manslaughter in a case where defendant learned that his former girlfriend had been seeing other
men); LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 1, § 7.10(bX5), at 656-57. But see State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d
272, 278 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to expand adultery pigeonhole).
131 MODELPENALCODE § 210.3 (1980).
132 State v. Saxon, 86 A. 590, 594 (Conn. 1913).
133 See Nourse, supra note 54, at 1362-66; cf. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y.
1980) (holding that the defendant was entitled to manslaughter instruction when he claimed he was
upset because the victim, whom he had casually dated a few times, told him she was not falling
in love with him).
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seen his former girlfriend dancing with another man two weeks before he killed
her.134 Another court instructed the jury on manslaughter based on the defendant's
testimony that he had observed his wife taking phone calls from an ex-boyfiiend. 135
In yet another case that reached the jury, the "reasonable explanation or excuse"
consisted of the defendant's having seen his wife in the presence of another man.136
Such cases, which demonstrate how greatly the Model Penal Code broadens the
common law's adultery pigeonhole, cannot be defended on either retributive or
utilitarian grounds.
2. Underinclusivity
In addition to reducing murder to manslaughter based on circumstances whose
mitigating nature is dubious at best, existing law overlooks circumstances of an
unquestionably mitigating nature.
Dudley & Stephens, the famous life-boat case whose facts are summarized
above,137 provides an excellent example. Numerous mitigating circumstances
accompanied the killing. First; in contrast with the brutal slaying of the ten-year-old
victim in Anderson, Dudley and Stephens were not insensitive to their victim's
interests. They did not want to kill the boy unless absolutely necessary to the survival
of the other three in the lifeboat and thus they waited until the boy himself was near
death. Second, as in Forest, their premeditation had a mitigating rather than an
aggravating significance. They discussed the killing and, due to moral qualms about
it; waited until they reasonably thought there were no altematives. 138 Third, there
were extreme and highly unusual circumstances, with the men having been on the
high seas in a small boat for nearly three weeks, near starvation, and understandably
fearful of losing their lives.
Finally, as the jury found, they reasonably believed that unless they killed the
youngest crew member they had no appreciable chance of surviving until their rescue.
In other words, they reasonably believed that they were saving three lives instead of
letting all four crewmen die. The defendants' reasonable belief that they needed to kill
134 State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
135 People v. Aphaylath, 499 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (N.Y. App. Div.), rev'don other grounds,
502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986).
136 State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Or. 1984).
137 See supra note 104-09 and accompanying text. The case is reprinted in many criminal
law texts. See, e.g., KAPLAN ET Ai., supra note 2, at 637; LLoYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW:
CAsEs, COMMENT, QuEsnoNs 248,361 (6th ed. 1998).
138 Like Forest, Dudley & Stephens is a case in which premeditation has mitigating rather
aggravating significance. Dudley's and Stephens's reflections on whether to kill indicated moral
anguish, not Machiavellian planning and insensitivity to the victim's interests. See supra text
between notes 95 and 96.
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one person, who was bound to die soon anyway, to save the lives of three other
persons arguably excuses or even justifies the killing, thereby absolving them of any
homicide liability.139 Even if one assumes that the British Law Lords in Dudley &
Stephens were right to reject a defense of necessity for homicide, such necessity
nonetheless mitigates the wrongfulness of the killing.
Together, these mitigating circumstances easily merit placing the killing in the
least serious group of intentional homicides. The jury, which took the highly unusual
step of deferring the question of guilt or innocence to the court, apparently thought
so. So did the Crown, which commuted Dudley's and Stephens's death sentences to
the six months they had already served. 140
Both retributivist and utilitarian considerations reinforce the conclusion that the
Dudley & Stephens killing belongs in the least serious offense category. Rather than
offending the respect for individual autonomy that underlies retributivism, the killing
at least arguably was required by it The infringrnent upon the victim's autonomy was
mitigated by the reality that he would have soon died of starvation anyway. More
important, if Dudley and Stephens had not killed the boy, then the three others in the
lifeboat also would have died and have had their autonomy extinguished altogether.
Dudley and Stephens had a choice between extinguishing the autonomy of one
persbn who would have died soon anyway or extinguishing the autonomy of all four
crewmen. Respect for individual autonomy would seem to dictate the latter choice. 141
Of course, Kant, history's most influential retributivist believed that it was wrong to
treat one person as a means to another's ends14 2 and the kilting in Dudley & Stephens
might be deemed wrongful for that reason. Even so, judged in terms of its disrespect
for individual autonomy, it still belongs among the least serious intentional
homicides.
Utilitarian considerations yield the same conclusion. Judged in isolation, the
killing itself would seem to be justifiable on utilitarian grounds given that it resulted
in a net savings of lives. 143 A utilitarian nonetheless might resist absolving Dudley
and Stephens of criminal liability altogether because to do so would entail recognition
of a necessity defense that in other cases might be misapplied or encourage
139 See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360,366-67 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383)
(recognizing in dicta that necessity may be a defense to homicide in limited circumstances);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3, 14-17 (1980) (accepting necessity defense to homicide);
Wechsler & Michael, supra note 3, at 738-39.
140 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 55, at 136 n.2.
141 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3, at 14 (1980) ("conduct that results in taldng life
may promote the very value sought to be protected by the law of homicide").
142 IMMANuLKANcr, T)H MTAPHYSICALELEMENTS OF JUSTiCE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
143 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1, at 9-10 (1980). See generally Philippa Foot,
Utilitarianism and the Virtues, 94 MIND 196 (1985).
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unwarranted killings. 144 Yet even if such slippery slope concerns justifying treating
the Dudley & Stephens killing as criminal homicide, the killing belongs in the least
serious group of intentional homicides. The extreme and unusual circumstances of
the case make it implausible to argue that Dudley and Stephens required severe
punishment to incapacitate or rehabilitate them or to deter others similarly situated in
the future.
Notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances and potent arguments for placing
the Dudley & Stephens killing in the least serious offense category, it could not be
classified as manslaughter under existing law. Dudley and Stephens were not in the
throes of passion when they killed, as required by the common law version of
manslaughter. In addition, the necessity for the killing fits into none of the common
law pigeonholes of provocations deemed adequate to reduce a killing from murder
to manslaughter.145 The arguable necessity could qualify as a "reasonable excuse or
explanation" under the Model Penal Code formulation. However, Dudley and
Stephens probably were not laboring under any "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance" when they decided to kill. Like the common law, the Model Penal Code
provision on manslaughter has impulsive killings in mind and Dudley and Stephens
premeditated the boy's killing.
The Forest case discussed in Part II, which involved the defendant's
premeditated "mercy killing" of his dying father, is yet another case involving
powerful mitigating circumstances that the law of manslaughter, at least in its
common law version, overlooks. Forest evidently believed that his father's prognosis
was hopeless and his death imminent and that he was acting in his father's best
interests. He was quite upset with what he understandably perceived as his father's
loss of dignity and felt tremendous remorse and sorrow after the killing. Judged in
light of either the lack of respect for individual autonomy or the needs for
incapacitation or deterrence, these mitigating circumstances place the killing among
the least culpable and heinous intentional killings. Under the common law, however,
the killing is not a candidate for manslaughter because there was no provocation
fitting into one of the predetermined common law pigeonholes. Whether the killing
may qualify as manslaughter under the Model Penal Code depends on whether Forest
was suffering from "an extreme emotional or mental disturbance." 146
In identifying circumstances that may mitigate murder to manslaughter, then,
existing law is both overinclusive and underinclusive. As in Schnopps, it takes notice
144 Such slippery slope concerns were central to Lord Coleridge's opinion rejecting a
necessity defense in Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 281-88 (1884).
145 See supra Part I.B.
146 MODELPENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980). If so, ajury would be permitted to find that
the various mitigating factors surrounding the killing constituted "a reasonable explanation or
excuse." If Forest was not in the throes of emotion when he killed his father then the outcome is
different Like the common law, the Model Penal Code would treat as irrelevant the other
mitigating circumstances still present.
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of circumstances whose mitigating force is weak or nonexistent while, as in Dudley
& Stephens and Forest, overlooking circumstances of an undeniably mitigating
nature.
B. Aggravation and Familial Duties
Consider the facts of Brooks v. State: 147
Approximately one month prior to her death, the victim filed for divorce. The defendant
subsequently moved into a trailer about a block from the victim's house.... [O]n
numerous occasions the defendant publicly pled with the victim to reconcile with him
which the victim adamantly refused to do. One witness testified the defendant vowed "he
would see [the victim] dead before he'd let her get a divorce."... [O]n the day of the
victim's death,... the defendant telephoned the victim's house,... [and] the victim
refused to speak to him [saying that] she did not have time to talk to him because "she
was going on a hot date." [The defendant then walked to the victim's house and after she
walked out of the house he began shooting her.]
Mhe defendant then nudged the victim's body with his foot and stated, "You
whore, you won't whore no more." The victim's fourteen-year-old daughter testified that
she watched from several feet away while the defendant approached the victim and
opened fire on her. The victim's daughter testified that neither the defendant nor the
victim spoke before the defendant shot.
Brooks illustrates yet another basic deficiency in the law of manslaughter-
searching only for mitigation, it overlooks the contemporaneous presence of
aggravating circumstances. Intimate relationships and family life are very frequently
the stuff of manslaughter cases. While such relationships undoubtedly can and do
give rise to very powerful and understandable emotions, they also give rise to some
serious familial obligations. Without good justification, the law of manslaughter
focuses on the understandable emotions and ignores the breach of familial
obligations. Contrary to both the traditional paradigm and existing versions of the new
paradigm,148 this section argues for treating the killer's breach of such obligations as
an aggravating factor in some circumstances.
147 292 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. 1982).
148 Aggravating factors that do not focus on family obligations may applyin an intra-familial
setting. For instance, an intra-familial killing may be premeditated. However, there is only one
commonly recognized circumstance relevant to the grade of the offense that focuses specifically
on familial obligations: the common-law rule that a heat-of-passion killing upon the discovery of
adultery mitigates an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter. See supra notes 114,130-36
and accompanying text.
In response to recent attention to domestic violence, a growing trend has developed in favor
of creating separate and more serious offenses for nonlethal assaults against family members. See,
eg., 2000 AL. Acrs 266 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to -618 (Michie 1997 & Supp.
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Applying an expanded version of the common law's adultery pigeonhole, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Brooks held that the jury should have been instructed on
heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter. This result, and the law of manslaughter it
reflects, are hard to defend. Even if one grants that Brooks's wife's confessed
infidelity by itself should be treated as sufficient to mitigate murder to manslaughter,
which is especially questionable given that she had already filed for divorce and was
living elsewhere, 149 several powerful aggravating factors were also present.
The first and most obvious aggravating circumstance is that Brooks brutally
killed his wife while their fourteen-year-old daughter watched. In other contexts, the
law recognizes and enforces parental obligations to care for the well-being of
children. 150 In knowingly exposing his daughter to the horror of witnessing her
mother's killing, Brooks was outrageously insensitive to his daughter's well-being.
1999); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-3.2 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000). So far, however, this
trend anomalously has had little impact on the law of homicide.
Only a handful of jurisdictions treat violation of familial obligations as an aggravating
circumstance relevant to the grade of homicide offenses. Minnesota's recent domestic abuse statute
makes it first-degree murder to kill a family or household member while committing domestic
abuse "when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and
the death occurs in circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.' MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp. 2000). Minnesota and a few other states have similar statutes that
apply when the victim was a child who had been previously abused by the defendant See Margaret
C. Hobday, Note, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of Intimate Violence: Minnesota's
Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1285,1290-91 (1994); cjf COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-
2-102(l)(f) (1999) (murder is first-degree murder when the victim is under twelve and the killer
occupied a position of trust).
The federal sentencing guidelines provide that "[f]amily ties.., are not ordinarily relevant
in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range" U.S.
SENTENcaNG GUIDEDN4Es MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2000).
149 Adultery generally should not be treated as a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce
the grade of the offense. See supra notes 114-36 and accompanying text. The case for treating
infidelity as such a mitigator in Brooks is especially unconvincing for the reasons mentioned in the
text.
150 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-2 (1999) (providing that a parent has an obligation to
provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of his or her child); LAFAVE & ScoTt,
supra note 1, § 3.3(a)(1) at 203; 59 AM. JuR. 2D PARENT& CHILD § 14 (1996); Bryan A. Liang
& Wendy L. Macfarlane, Murder by Omission: ChildAbuse and the Passive Parent, 36 HARv.
I LEGIS. 397,407 (1999).
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In legal terms, Brooks' act amounted to criminal child abuse' 5 ' as well as the tort of
the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. 152
Second, in addition to forcing his minor daughter to watch the killing, Brooks
permanently deprived her of the parent with whom she had been living. This, too, was
greatly insensitive to his child's interests. In divorce cases, each parent generally has
a legally enforceable obligation to allow the child reasonable access to the other
parent. 153 The obligation exists not only to protect the interests of each parent, but
also to promote the child's welfare. While even temporary breaches of this obligation
constitute a legal wrong, 154 the law of homicide anomalously treats the permanent
breach that results from the killing of the other parent as irrelevant to the grade of the
offense.
Finally, the defendant failed to accord due respect to his wife's legal right to
divorce. His wife was living in a separate household and had filed for divorce. She
had persistently refused the defendant's repeated entreaties for reconciliation. Divorce
laws, and the liberalizing reforms of them, are premised on the notion that individuals
have a right to change partners. The same respect for individual autonomy that
undergirds the right to divorce also underlies retributivism, which derives its
inspiration from Kantian moral philosophy. On a retributive view, then, a defendant
who kills his victim because she has exercised her right to end one intimate
relationship and begin another has committed a serious moral and legal wrong. The
wrongfulness of the killing in Brooks was aggravated by the fact that it was motivated
at least in part by the victim's filing for divorce and refusing to reconcile with the
defendant.
In reversing Brooks's murder conviction and holding that the killing was an
appropriate candidate for manslaughter, the Georgia Supreme Court overlooked three
aggravating factors: the defendant's abuse of his daughter in having her watch the
killing, the abuse of his daughter in forever depriving her of her mother, and the
defendant's failure to respect his wife's legal right to divorce him.
Unfortunately, Brooks is not an aberration. Numerous other reported cases reflect
judicial determinations that a killing qualifies for manslaughter even though the
151 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 (1999) (cruelty to children in the first-degree consists of
a parent maliciously causing a minor child excessive mental pain; second-degree consists of a
parent's intentionally allowing a child to witness intra-family battery).
152 See Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 SE.2d 835 (Ga. 1991) (setting forth elements
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which include extreme and outrageous conduct and
severe emotional distress).
153 Cf GA. CODEANN. § 19-9-3(d) (1999) ("It is the express policy of this state to encourage
that a minor child has continuing contact with parents ... and to encourage parents to share in the
rights and responsibilities of raising their children after such parents have separated or dissolved
their marriage").
154 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45 (1999) (making it a criminal offense to interfere with
custodyrights).
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defendant killed the mother of his children and/or failed to respect his wife's decision
to separate and divorce him.155 Such cases appear to arise with greater frequency in
Model Penal Code jurisdictions, 156 which is not surprising given the Code's
broadened version of manslaughter.
In her comprehensive study, Professor Nourse found that courts applying
provisions modeled on the Model Penal Code have frequently instructed juries on
manslaughter when the "reasonable explanation or excuse" consisted of the victim's
having exercised her legitimate right to divorce or separate from her spouse or former
lover.157 Focusing on jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code's manslaughter
provisions, Professor Nourse identified all reported cases from the 1980-1995 period
"in which a provocation claim was asserted in the context of an adult intimate
relationship."' 158 In approximately twenty percent of the cases she identified (26 of
133), courts instructed juries on manslaughter when a principal excuse or explanation
155 See, e.g., People v. Spurlin, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (reporting that
defendant killed the mother of his two children); Strickland v. State, 357 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 1987)
(reporting that defendant and his wife entered into a separation agreement and that when she
refused to reconcile, citing sexual involvement with others, defendant killed her); Raines v. State,
277 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. 1981) (allowing manslaughter instruction where defendant killed the mother
of his three children); Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 417 N.E.2d 1213 (Mass. 1981) (reversing trial
court's refusal to instruct jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant killed his wife, with
whom he had children, after she had moved out and had told him she wanted a divorce); State v.
Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1995) (affirming trial court's jury instruction on
manslaughter when defendant killed former girlfriend, the mother of his daughter); State v. Ott
686 P.2d 1001 (Or. 1984) (affinming trial court's jury instruction on manslaughter where defendant
killed estranged wife and mother ofhis child); c. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980)
(holding defendant entitled to have trier of fact consider manslaughter verdict where defendant was
upset over victim whom he had casually dated telling him she was not falling in love with him).
In 1998, there were 1,830 cases of intentional killings of intimate partners. Three out of four
of the victims were women, and approximately thirty percent of all female victims of intentional
homicides were killed by an intimate partner. By contrast, approximately four percent of all male
victims of intentional homicides were killed by an intimate partner. CAILIE MARIE RENNISON &
SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2000).
156 See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (reporting, without
addressing the merits of the issue, that trial court instructed jury on manslaughter based on
defendant's emotional upset over having witnessed his former girlfriend dance with another man
two weeks prior to the killing); State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154, 157 (Conn. 1989) (indicating, without
addressing the merits of the issue, that trial court had instructed jury on manslaughter based on
defendant's upset over rumors of infidelity on the part of his wife, who had moved out, filed for
divorce, and had obtained a restraining order against defendant).
157 Professor Nourse observes that the Model Penal Code "has permitted juries to retum a
manslaughter verdict in cases where the defendant claims passion because the victim lef%, moved
the furniture out, planned a divorce, or sought a protective order." Nourse, supra note 54, at 1332
(footnotes omitted).
158 Id at 1345.
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for the defendant's emotional state was that the victim sought to leave a relationship
that "was over, ending, or about to end."1 59
The animating purposes of criminal punishment reinforce the intuitive
conclusion that the law ought to take into account a defendant's violation of familial
obligations in such cases. Existing law allows the victim's breach of a serious legal
obligation owed to the defendant to mitigate the grade of the offense.' 60 This same
retributivist logic implies that the killer's breach of serious obligations to his victim
or his children also ought to influence the grade of the offense. 161 When, as in
Brooks, the defendant forces his child to witness the killing and/or permanently
deprives the child of one parent he violates serious moral and legal obligations to his
children. The killing is more wrongful for that A killing is also more wrongful when,
also as in Brooks, he kills in response to the victim's exercise of her legal right of
autonomy to end their relationship, file for divorce, and commence other intimate
relationships. In such cases, the retributivist insistence on just deserts demands that
the killer's breach of familial obligations be taken into account in classifying the
severity of the offense and selecting an appropriate level of punishment.
A utilitarian view of the purposes of criminal punishment would also generally
treat violations of the familial obligations discussed above as aggravating in nature.
Those who defend reducing the punishment for heat-of-passion killings often do so
on the ground that the interest in specific deterrence applies weakly, if at all, to such
killings. 162 According to this argument, the defendant is quite unlikely to kill in the
future because he was subject to unusual pressures that probably will not recur.
159 Id. at 1352,1356; see also JOHNM. DAWsoN& PATICKA. LANGAN, BUREAUOFJUSnCE
STATIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MURDER iN FAMIEs 7 tbl.12 (1994) (finding that of those
convicted of intentional homicide in large urban counties in 1988, approximately 58% who killed
nonfamilymembers were convicted of murder as opposed to manslaughter while 48% who killed
family members were convicted of murder).
160 See supra notes 53, 115 and accompanying text.
16 1 See Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 521,
532 (1987).
Extreme and repetitive child abuse may call for more severe sanctions than assault by
strangers. Certainly the "family context," which is the defining aspect of parental incest,
justifies more serious sanctions for the same reasons that embezzlement can be a more
severely punished property crime: the penal wrong is exacerbated by abuse of trust.
Id at 533.
162 See State v. Krieger, 731 P.2d 592,594 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (trial court had concluded
that deterrence of the defendant would not be served by further imprisonment where defendant had
killed wife's lover); Nourse, supra note 54, at 1373-74; Joshua Dressier, Provocation: Partial
Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REv. 467,470 n. 18 (1988); Jack K. Weber, Some
Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 159, 171 (1981);
Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the Reasonable
Man, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1037-38 (1958).
1048 [Vol 62:1007
CHANGING PARADIGMS IN HOMICIDE
Whatever its force in other contexts, this justification is unpersuasive in the context
of domestic violence. Domestic violence involves on-going relationships. Given that
most persons have intimate and family relationships throughout the course of their
adult lives, the pressures that arise from divorce, separation, infidelity, and the like
carry considerable likelihood of repeating themselves within an individual's life. The
available evidence indicates that domestic violence is characterized by relatively high
rates of recidivism. 163 The utilitarian interests in specific deterrence and
incapacitation, it seems, should carry significant weight.164
Furthermore, general deterrence also argues for increasing, not decreasing, the
punishment for those who kill in violation of family obligations. Given the
impulsivity of many such killings, increased punishment probably does not enter into
the explicit cost-benefit calculations of potential offenders and therefore cannot really
deter. Even so, enhanced punishment has an educative function, which ultimately has
a deterrent effect The punishment of any given defendant sends a message to others
similarly situated. Through media accounts and from acquaintances, potential
offenders become aware of the degree of punishment meted out in certain kinds of
cases. Over time, the repeated communication of these punishments influences a
potential offender's perception of the value that society, and very possibly the
offender, places on certain kinds ofwrongs. These internalized values affect conduct,
not so much because they are explicitly called to mind, but rather because, through
implicit perceptions of wrongfulness and permissibility, they exert a subconscious
tug.165
163 See People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1995) (reporting that defendant killed his fourth
wife after his third wife mysteriously disappeared, he was on parole for murdering his second wife,
and he had threatened to kill his first wife); Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990)
(reporting that when paroled from killing his first wife, defendant killed his girlfriend); Coker,
supra note 125, at 112 ('men who are abusive in one relationship are likely to abuse again in the
next relationship"); Nourse, supra note 54, at 1373-74; Rapaport, supra note 125, at 1533; Alison
J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection ofDomestic Violence and Guns: The Public Interest Exception
and the LautenbergAmendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 824 (2000); cf PATRICKA. LANGAN
& JOHN M. DAwsoN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS iN LARGE URBAN
COU'mES 21 tbl.35 (1995) (reporting that 70% ofhusbands who kill their wives had a prior arrest
or conviction).
164 Cf Amy Thisflethwaite et al., Severity of Dispositions andDometic Violence Recidivism,
44 CRIME & DELiNQ. 388, 396 (1998) (finding that more severe sentences that included jail plus
probation lowered recidivism, especially in cases involving perpetrators with a stake in
conformity).
165 On the "educative" impact of criminal punishments, see, e.g., JAMEs Q. WuSON &
RiCHARD J. HERRNSTEN, CRME AND HUMAN NATURE 494-96 (1985); FRANKUN E. ZMRING,
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 4-5 (1971); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments
Educate?, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 733, 750-51 n.84 (1998) (citing sources); Johannes Andenaes,
General Prevention-llusion orReality?, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRM1NOLOGY & POuLCE SCr. 176,179-
80(1952).
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In this way, treating a family relationship as an aggravating circumstance holds
some promise of deterring intra-familial violence. By allowing passion to mitigate
murder to manslaughter when the killer has violated intra-familial obligations,
existing law implicitly sends the message that the breach of such obligations does not
matter. Worse, given that the passions that mitigate murder to manslaughter
frequently arise in domestic situations, existing law can be seen to imply that intra-
familial violence is not as wrongful as violence in other contexts. Treating a family
relationship as an aggravating circumstance would have the salutary effect of
communicating the opposite message that one owes higher obligations to family
members and that the breach of familial obligations makes a killing more wrongful.
The need to send such a message is amplified by the number of persons who can be
expected to experience emotional stress from family life and "the tendency of family
violence to represent a continuing threat. '166 It is also amplified by the higher
obligation that most utilitarians would say a person owes to family members than to
strangers. 167 In light of all of these considerations, one may reasonably suppose that
treating a family relationship as an aggravating circumstance relevant to the grade of
the offense would deter some intra-familial violence.168
166 Zimring, supra note 161, at 533; cf Nathan, supra note 163, at 824 ("Of all the women
murdered in the United States in a given year, approximately thirty percent lose their lives to
husbands or boyfriends.'); RONETBACHMAN, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSICE, VIOLENCE AGAINsT WOMEN:
A NATIONALCRIME VCrVZATION SURvEY REPORT 1 (1994) (stating that between 1973 and 1991
the violent crime rate for women has remained stable while this same rate has declined for men).
167 See Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism andAiding Others, in TIm LIMITS OF UILrrARANISM
225,227 (H.B. Miller & W.H. Williams eds., 1982).
168 See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1498, 1522-24 (1993) (arguing that the deterrent impact of recent harsh treatment of drunk
driving argues for similar treatment of domestic violence).
The argument, of course, presumes that increased punishment will have a deterrent effect
Although policymakers certainly presume that increased punishment generally deters crime, it is
notoriously difficult as an empirical matter to determine whether and to what extent this is so. The
available general evidence on the deterrent impact of increased punishment appears inconclusive.
Compare WILSON & HEaRNsMEN, supra note 165, at 393-96 (concluding that increased
punishment deters), with MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCaNG MATTERS 137 (1996) (stating that the
consensus among governmental advisory boards in various countries is that increased penalties
probably do not significantly reduce the incidence of crime). See DETERRENE AND
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFETS OF CRIMINAL SANcTONs ON CRIME RATEs (Alfred
Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) (containing a report issued by a panel of experts on the subject as well
as several commissioned papers reviewing and interpreting existing literature on deterrence and
incapacitation).
The available evidence in the context of domestic violence is conflicting and of very little
relevance here because it focuses mostly on the effect of arrests for nonlethal incidents of domestic
violence and does not consider at all the deterrent and incapacitative effects of sentence severity
for homicide offenses. See JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRMINALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMIsEs AND LIMtrs (1996) (discussing possible legal reform to inhibit
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Violation of familial obligations such as the ones discussed above, although
perhaps the most conspicuous example, is not the only aggravating factor that the law
of manslaughter now ignores. Aggravating factors, such as the cruel infliction of
extreme suffering or the youth or vulnerability of the victim, often coexist with
circumstances that the law now treats as sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter.
Peny v. Commonwealth169 provides a particularly egregious example. In Peny, the
Kentucky Supreme Court declared that an instruction on manslaughter was
appropriate even though (i) the victim was a police officer who had served legal
papers on the defendant; (ii) Perry fired on the officer five times, with one shot
severing the officer's spine; (iii) while the officer was lying paralyzed on the ground,
Perry pointed his gun at the officer's head and pulled the trigger (but the gun
jammed); and (iv) Perry tried to run over the officer with his car as he left.170 The jury
was asked to decide only whether Perry had suffered from an excused emotional
disturbance. The numerous aggravating circumstances played no recognized role in
grading the offense, although they probably exerted an illicit subterranean influence
on the jury's actual decision. Existing law is structured in a way that takes cognizance
of mitigating circumstances but blithely ignores the simultaneous presence of
aggravating circumstances. 171
C. Conclusion
In both its common law and Model Penal Code incarnations, the law of
manslaughter suffers from serious shortcomings. It permits murder to be reduced to
domestic violence, but only in the context of "battering" or assault, not homicide). Good reasons
exist for believing that increased sentence severity will have deterrent effects in the context of
domestic violence. As Professor Zinring has written, "[tlhe potential for high levels of detection,
and thus for enhanced deterrence and incapacitation, may distinguish family violence from other
crimes and justify more optimism about punitive approaches in family violence prevention.'
Zimring, supra note 161, at 535. See also Daniel D. Polsby, SuppressingDomestic Violence Jith
Law Reonns, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRlINOOGY 250,252 (1992) (hypothesizing that dealing more
severely with intrafamilial violence would likely have a general deterrent effect in the long term);
cf Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 458-60
(1997) (arguing that the likelihood of escaping apprehension is the primary reason for skepticism
about the deterrent impact of increased sentences).
169 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992).
170 Id at 269-70.
171 See, e.g., State v. Whatley, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1952 (May 14, 1996) (convicting
defendant of voluntary manslaughter even though the two victims were children); Dixon v. State,
597 S.W.2d 77,78 (Ark. 1980) (holding that defendant was entitled to instruction on Model Penal
Code version of manslaughter even though he viciouslybeat the victim repeatedly throughout the
night despite her entreaties for him to stop); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980)
(holding that defendant was entitled to manslaughter instruction even though he repeatedly stabbed
the victim and then drowned her in a bathtub).
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manslaughter on the basis of circumstances whose mitigating significance is quite
suspect while ignoring circumstances that do carry significant mitigating weight. It
also permits murder to be reduced to manslaughter in the face of powerful
aggravating circumstances, which frequently involve the commission of very serious
wrongs against family members.
The new paradigm provides a better framework for grading. Instead of searching
only for excused passion, its structure allows for the recognition of multiple
mitigating circumstances. Instead of exclusively focusing on only mitigating
circumstances, its structure recognizes that both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances can exist alongside one another.
Still, the content of the new paradigm must be modified to remedy existing law's
complete failure to regard a breach of familial obligations as an aggravating
circumstance. In other contexts, the law recognizes that one owes higher obligations
to one's immediate family, especially minor children. When the defendant kills in
violation of family obligations-by, for instance, depriving his children of a parent-
retributivist and utilitarian justifications jointly support treating the breach as an
aggravating circumstance relevant to the grade of the offense.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING HOMICIDE LAW
The traditional paradigm's list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
both too short and too long. It assigns a homicide to the most serious offense category
of first-degree murder based solely on the aggravating circumstances of premeditation
and commission of a felony. It thereby overlooks other significant aggravating factors
and any mitigating factors that also may be present, including the occasionally
mitigating nature of premeditation itself. It also relies on a fundamentally flawed set
of considerations in assigning an intentional homicide to the least serious offense
category of manslaughter. The traditional paradigm gives effect to circumstances such
as the victim's infidelity, whose mitigating force is questionable at best, overlooks
other circumstances of an obviously mitigating nature such as necessity, and treats as
irrelevant the presence of serious aggravating circumstances, such as the breach of
familial obligations that the killer owed to the victim's children. This critique of
traditional law supports the new paradign's general structure, which permits
consideration of a greater array of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
allows them to be balanced against one another when they coexist
Still, important questions remain. The first question concerns the number of
offenses that should be used in the grading scheme. On the one end of the spectrum,
the law could establish more than the three or four offenses that now exist. On the
other end of the spectrum, the law could establish only one offense for intentional
homicides, thus leaving it up to the sentencing process to calibrate the importance of
any and all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Of course, creating one catch-
all offense would have the effect of removing juries from the grading process. The
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proper number of offenses thus implicates a second question, or set of questions,
concerning the proper roles ofjudges, juries, and legislatures in the grading process.
Yet a third question, which arises so long as the law continues to recognize more than
one offense for intentional homicides, concerns which aggravating and mitigating
factors ought to be recognized as relevant to the grade of the offense. The
circumstances set forth in death penalty statutes, which are meant to govern the
sentencing phase of death penalty cases, should not necessarily govern the
classification of intentional homicides generally.
This Part grapples with these questions. It argues that, with some significant
modification of its content, the new paradigm's reach should be extended beyond the
death penalty sentencing context to the grading of intentional homicides generally.
Consistent with existing law, this Part maintains both that the law should recognize
several offenses for intentional homicides and that grading should not be left solely
to the discretion ofjudges at sentencing. Instead, the grading process should involve
both jurors, who classify intentional homicides into one of several offense categories,
and legislatures, which specifythe aggravating and mitigating circumstances to guide
juror classification decisions.
This Part also proposes a draft statute, which includes a model list of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances relevant to the grade of the offense. This list overlaps
with, but has some significant differences from, the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that are now generally found in death penalty statutes. Whereas death
penalty statutes include circumstances relating to the defendant's prior record, this
Part maintains that such circumstances should not influence the grade of the offense,
but rather, in the interests of efficiency and fairness, should be left to sentencing.
Also, in contrast with death penalty statutes, it proposes treating a breach of serious
familial obligations as an aggravating circumstance relevant to the grade of the
offense.
A. The General Frameworkfor Reform
Any system for classifying homicides must balance the need to classify
homicides accurately, in accordance with the degree of punishment warranted on the
facts of the particular case, against the needs for simplicity and efficiency. The interest
in accuracy calls for classifying homicides into more, rather than fewer, offenses and
for considering more, rather than fewer, aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The interests in simplicity and speed push in the opposite direction, arguing for fewer
offenses and for consideration of fewer aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The traditional paradigm strikes the balance on the side of efficiency and
sacrifices accuracy, even more than is necessary, to achieve that level of efficiency.
In considering just a few aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and in never
permitting aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be weighed against one
another, it does have the virtue ofrelative simplicity. However, it fares very poorly on
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the dimension of accuracy. In part, this results from the efficiency of relying on just
a few aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As we have seen, however, it is also
partly the result of relying on the wrong aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Cases such as Anderson, 172 Schnopps, 173and Brooks, 174 which unfortunately are not
atypical, illustrate the unacceptable degree to which the traditional paradigm
compromises accuracy.
1. The Number of Offenses
One appealing way to reconcile the competing interests of accuracy and
efficiency would be to have one catch-all offense for intentional homicides, thus
leaving it up to the sentencing process to calibrate the relative importance of any and
all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This approach would satisfy the interest
in efficiency by simplifying the jury's task into one of determining only whether the
homicide was intentional. It would also respond to the interest in efficiency by
remitting the complex task of determining the existence and relative weight of all
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances to sentencing. The task is
performed more efficiently in this setting because in the overwhelming bulk of
jurisdictions, it is accomplished by ajudge rather than a multi-member jury, it is done
on a more informal record, and it is accomplished through use of a preponderance of
the evidence standard. While producing efficiency gains, the one-offense approach
simultaneously accommodates the need for accuracy by allowing the sentencing
judge to make a fine-grained determination based on a much more numerous set of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Despite these attractions, the one-offense approach has the unacceptable
consequence of removing juries from the process of grading homicides. Under
existing law, jurors participate in the grading process by deciding which of several
offenses applies on a given set of facts. Legislatures participate by specifying the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that define those offenses. The one-offense
approach, in contrast, leaves it entirely to judges to decide, based on the facts of the
case, which aggravating and mitigating circumstances exist, their relative-weight, and
the appropriate range of punishment.
In removing the jury from the grading process, the one-offense approach raises
serious constitutional doubts. In a line of cases beginning in the 1970s,175 the Court
has indicated that the Constitution imposes some limits on the extent to which facts
172 See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 103, 118-21 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
175 Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998);
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79
(1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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relevant to the severity of punishment may be determined by a judge at sentencing.
One issue concerns the import of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury on the
allocation of fact-finding between judge and jury.176 A related but conceptually
distinct issue concerns those surrounding circumstances that must be treated as an
element of the offense, subject to the due process requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.177 This past term, in Aprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that
"'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.' '178
The one-offense approach would not violate a strict construction of the principle
the Aprendi majority identified. Taken literally, that principle is violated only when
a judge determines the existence of a fact that increases the applicable sentencing
range. Under the one-offense approach, in contrast, the existence of any given
mitigating or aggravating circumstance would not alter the sentencing range itself;
instead, it would only influence the defendant's placement within an exceedingly
broad range.
Still, Aprendi casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of the one-offense
approach. It is quite doubtful that the Court would permit legislatures to evade the
Aprendi principle through the stratagem of lumping separate offenses, each of which
had carried a separate sentencing range, into a single offense having an encompassing
sentencing range. The Court dropped a footnote indicating the possibility of
constitutional difficulties with such an end-run around the principle it embraced. 179
Further, in holding that the Constitution requires that facts increasing the sentencing
range be found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt, Aprendi adopted the suggestion
of Jones v. United States.180 In Jones, the Court intimated that a fact that traditionally
has been treated as an element of the offense and subject to proof to ajury beyond a
reasonable doubt may not constitutionally be converted into a circumstance to be
found by a sentencing judge.181 On this view, the one-offense approach violates the
Constitution insofar as it transforms circumstances traditionally relevant to the grade
of the homicide offense, such as premeditation or provocation, into factors intended
to influence placement of the case within a single, broad sentencing range covering
all intentional homicides.
176 In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,148-49 (1968), the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to trial byjury, thereby
making it applicable in state criminal prosecutions.
177 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
178 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1990)).
179 Id. at 2363 n.16.
180 526 U.S. at 243.
18 1 Id at 241-42.
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Even if the Constitution were to permit it, putting the grading process entirely in
the hands of sentencing judges would be bad policy. Democratic political principles
argue strongly for involving both juries and legislatures. The criminal law generally
is law at its most coercive, and the law of homicide provides for the harshest
punishments that the criminal law has to offer. It is an important democratic safeguard
to have "we the people" review and endorse the differing levels of coercion
contemplated by the various homicide offenses. 182 It is true that legislatures and juries
generally do not grade other felonies, such as burglary, into separate offense
categories based upon their relative seriousness. However, the degree of
governmental coercion available for homicide offenses is potentially much greater
and the sentencing spectrum much wider, often ranging from probation to death.
Having legislatures specify the considerations relevant to the grade of the offense and
havingjuries apply those considerations on the facts of particular cases provides some
guarantee that, in each case, the degree of punishment actually imposed has broad
public support and comports with basic community values.183 In this way, the
participation of legislatures and juries checks governmental power and discretion,
much in the same way as the separation of powers generally precludes one
governmental branch from acting without the concurrence of another branch. The
one-offense approach is at odds with the distrust of governmental power that
underlies longstanding and fundamental features of American political institutions.
In contrast with the one-offense approach, the tripartite offense structure that
many jurisdictions now use strikes a sensible balance between the need to involve
juries and legislatures in the grading process, on the one hand, and the need for
efficiency, on the other. Unlike the one-offense approach, three offenses allow both
juries and legislatures to have meaningful input regarding the attributes of especially
aggravated and mitigated cases of intentional homicide. A fewer number of offenses
would disable juries and legislatures from having such input. A greater number of
offenses for intentional homicide risks unduly complicating the jury's decision.
2. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Efficiency also figures into the selection of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that influence the grade of the offense. The traditional paradigm
focuses on too few aggravating and mitigating circumstances and selects the wrong
ones for inclusion on a short list. Of course, the longer the list of circumstances
relevant to the jury's choice among offenses, the more complex and cumbersome the
182 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,530 (1975); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157
(1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
183 Cf Brenner, supra note 3, at 295 (noting that without "the confines of legislatively
created categories of punitive severity," judicial sentencing decisions can be arbitrary and
disuniform).
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jury's task becomes. In addition, making a given circumstance relevant to the grade
of the offense lengthens the trial by opening the door to formal presentation of
evidence on that issue.
Efficiency and simplicity imply that, in general, only the most important
aggravating and mitigating circumstances should influence the grade of the
offense.184 The list should include only those considerations tending to have the
strongest bearing on the needs for deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, or,
viewing the criminal process from a retributivist angle, those considerations having
the most direct relevance to the offender's degree of moral culpability.185 Other less
important considerations can be taken into account at sentencing, where they can
influence placement of the case within the range prescribed for the offense of
conviction.
One group of considerations that probably should be left to sentencing involve
the defendant's general character, such as prior convictions. It is true that the presence
or absence of prior convictions probably has an important bearing on the needs for
specific deterrence and incapacitation. Despite their importance to the purposes of
criminal punishment however, the interests in efficiency and simplicity militate
strongly against making prior convictions and the like relevant to offense
categorization. Making such matters relevant to the offense categorization risks
transforming trials into lengthy forays into the accused's entire life history. If prior
convictions constitute an aggravating circumstance, then basic fairness dictates that
exemplary aspects of the defendant's past life be treated as mitigating
circumstances. 186 Making such matters relevant to the offense classification would
open the door to formal presentation of evidence through witnesses at the trial on the
merits. In contrast, leaving matters pertaining to the defendant's background to
sentencing permits the relevant information more informally in written and hearsay
form.
Good reasons exist for concluding that the greater efficiency of leaving the
defendant's general background to sentencing ought to prevail over that background's
relevance to need for punishment. First, the defendant's past acts and character are
collateral to the alleged acts that form the basis for criminal liability and around which
the trial revolves. Second, making the defendant's general background relevant at the
184 For a useful discussion of some of the more important considerations bearing on whether
a given circumstance should be an element of the offense or a sentencing factor, see Gerard E.
Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2
BuFF. CRiM. L. REV. 297,325-48 (1998).
185 Id. at 325 (asserting that the greater the moral significance of a given factor or the
punishment attached to its existence, the stronger the case for treating it as an element of the
offense rather than a sentencing consideration).
186 In the sentencing phase of death penalty cases, for instance, evidence that defendant had
been abused as a child is frequently adduced in mitigation. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood
Abuse andAdult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999).
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trial on the merits invites jurors to convict the accused because he is a bad person. 187
By generally excluding evidence of bad character and past bad acts, the law of
evidence tries.hard to minimize that danger.188 The danger obviously does not exist
at sentencing because the defendant has already been convicted. For these reasons,
it is wise to follow existing law189 by leaving the defendant's general character to
sentencing.
Several principles, then, structure the general framework for reform. First jurors
must be allowed to classify intentional homicides into several offense categories.
Substantially different ranges of punishment would remain available for each offense,
although perhaps with small areas of overlap. Although less efficient than having a
single catch-all offense, this approach is no less efficient than existing law.
Furthermore, multiple offenses are necessary to enable juries to play the meaningful
role in the grading process that democratic principles demand and the Constitution,
to some degree, requires.
Second, in the interests of efficiency and fairness, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances relating to the defendant's general background and character are
remitted to the sentencing process. In this respect, the approach follows the lead of the
traditional paradigm and differs from the new paradigm as it is currently employed,
which treats prior convictions as an aggravating circumstance. Some jurisdictions
treat prior convictions as relevant not only in the sentencing phase of death penalty
cases, but also in the guilt-innocence phase on the question whether the accused has
committed capital murder. 190
Third, in the interests of enhanced accuracy, a greater array of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances should be permitted to influence the grade of the offense,
and the jury should be permitted to consider both types of circumstances in cases
where they are jointly present. In these two respects, the framework outlined here
187 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,235 (1998) (finding thatmaking
prior convictions an element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor '"risks significant
prjudice").
188 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides that evidence of an accused's character and of
other wrongs are generally inadmissible because "'[i]t subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the
good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the
evidence in the case shows actually happened."' FED. R. EviD. 404, advisory committee's note
(quoting CAL. L. REvisION COMM'N, TENTATIvE RECOMMENDATION AND A STuDY RELATING TO
Tm UNiFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, REP., REc. & STumas 615 (1964)).
189 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230 (noting that "the lower courts have almost
uniformly interpreted statutes [that authorize higher sentences for recidivists] as setting forth
sentencing factors" and itself interpreting the recidivism element as a sentencing factor).
190 The new paradigm, which derives from the Model Penal Code's death penalty provisions,
see supra note 9 and accompanying text, was developed primarily for purposes of sentencing.
However, some jurisdictions have adopted it as a means of grading offenses and include prior
convictions as an aggravating factor.
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follows the structure of the new paradigm. This approach to some degree trades
efficiency for accuracy. The extent and desirability of the trade-off depends on which
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are considered, an issue to which the next
section turns.
B. The Specifics: A Draft Statute
This section moves from the general framework to the specifics of reform and
presents a draft statute. This statute extends the new paradigm's general approach of
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the grading of intentional
homicides generally. It directs the jury to classify an intentional homicide as first-
degree murder, second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter, depending on the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Although the draft statute follows the general model of the new paradigm,
significant differences exist. In addition to extending the new paradigm's reach
beyond the death penalty context, the draft statute offers a list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that differs from that found in the existing statutes. For
example, unlike existing statutes, the draft statute would sometimes allow the
existence of a family relationship between the victim or the victim's children to be
treated as an aggravating circumstance.
After presenting the text of the draft statute, this section proceeds to explain the
statute's relationship to the traditional and new paradigms as well as the basis for
including some aggravating and mitigating circumstances and omitting others. The
draft statute undoubtedly can be refined and improved. Some scholars and legislators
who accept its basic structure will disagree with some of the particulars proposed
here. Nonetheless, the statute can provide a useful starting point for discussion and
badly needed reform.
The text of the draft statute is as follows:
If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill the victim,
it shall decide whether to classify the killing as first-degree murder, second-degree
murder, or voluntary manslaughter as described in (A)-(C) below, based upon the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances specified in (1) and (2) below.
(A) First-degree murder. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is at least
one aggravating factor and no mitigating factor present or that the aggravating factor(s)
substantially outweigh(s) any mitigating factor(s), it shall return a verdict of first-degree
murder.
(B) Voluntary manslaughter. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is at
least one mitigating factor and no aggravating factor present or that the mitigating
factor(s) substantially outweigh(s) any aggravating factor(s), it shall return a verdict of
voluntary manslaughter.
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(C) Second-degree murder. The jury shall return a verdict of second-degree murder if it
makes neither the finding specified in (A) nor the finding specified in (B).
(1) Aggravating Factors:
(a) the killing was planned, and the planning exhibited exclusive concern for the
accused's selfish financial, sexual, emotional, or other interests and callous disregard for
the victim's interests;
(b) the killer had a family or other intimate relationship with the victim, and the killing
was neither motivated by an understandable view of the victim's best interests nor
provoked by the victim's serious abuse of the accused or of some other family member,
(c) the killing occurred while the accused was committing a separate felony involving
violence or sexual predation;
(d) the killing involved torture or the knowing infliction ofprotracted pain or suffering;
(e) the killing involved more than one victim;
(f) the victim was a law enforcement officer or was vulnerable by reason of age or
disability.
(2) Mitigating circumstances:
(a) the killer was in an extreme state of passion that was provoked by the victim's
commission of a serious legal wrong against the killer or the killer's family;
(b) the victim consented to the killing to relieve suffering;
(c) if the defenses of duress or necessity were extended to homicide, the killing would be
within one of those defenses;
(d) the accused genuinely but unreasonably believed that deadly force was needed to
prevent the imminent infliction of death or serious bodily harm by an unlawfiul aggressor.
The following explains the draft statute's relationship to the traditional and new
paradigms as well as the reasons why some aggravating and mitigating factors are
included while others are omitted:
(1) Aggravatingfactors
The statute's list of aggravating circumstances overlaps to some degree with the
traditional paradigm, overlaps to an even greater degree with the new paradigm, but
nonetheless differs significantly from both the traditional and new paradigms.
(a) Premeditation. Under the traditional paradigm, premeditation is one of two
aggravating factors that define first-degree murder, the most serious homicide offense.
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In sharp contrast, the death penalty statutes that give rise to the new paradigm
generally omit premeditation as an aggravating factor.191
The traditional paradigm's treatment of premeditation is deficient because
premeditation is not always aggravating in nature. As the Dudley & Stephens lifeboat
case192 and the Forest mercy-illing 93 illustrate, premeditation sometimes involves
reflection on a genuine moral dilemma and evinces concern for the victim's interests,
not calculated and callous insensitivity.
The Model Penal Code's death penalty provisions and the death penalty statutes
respond to this problem by identifying specific situations in which premeditation
clearly does reflect a reprehensible and dangerous disregard for others' interests. For
example, the Model Penal Code lists a killing committed for pecuniary gain, which
will generally involve planning and reflection, as an aggravating factor.194
This strategy of trying to list specific classes of cases in which premeditation has
aggravating significance is underinclusive. For instance, it is hard to see why a killing
for pecuniary gain should be treated as worse than one in which the killer plans to kill
his spouse for entirely selfish yet non-financial reasons.
The draft statute adopts the more inclusive strategy of phrasing the aggravating
factor in terms of the reason why premeditation can have aggravating significance.
It proposes that premeditation be treated as an aggravating circumstance when "the
planning exhibited exclusive concern for the accused's selfish emotional, sexual, or
financial interests and a callous disregard for the victim's interests." Such heightened
indifference to and disrespect for the victim's interests exacerbates the wrongfilness
of the crime on a retributivist scale. It also strengthens utilitarian arguments for
punishment by indicating an increased dangerousness and accompanying need for
longer incapacitation. As formulated in the draft statute, the aggravating factor for
planning would include contract killings and the like, while at the same time
excluding cases of mercy-killing such as Forest and other cases involving genuine
moral dilemmas about which reasonable persons can and do disagree, such as Dudley
& Stephens.
(b) Family relationship. One of the central theses of this article is that, contrary
to current homicide law, the existence of a family relationship between the killer and
the victim, or the victim's children, at least sometimes should be treated as an
191 These statutes often do list more specific aggravating factors that usually involve
planning. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(g) (1980) ("The murder was committed for
pecuniary gain.). In contrast with other death penalty statutes, the federal provision does list
premeditation generally as an aggravating factor. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9) (1994).
192 See supra notes 104-09, 137-45 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
194 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(g) (1980); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 891
(Neb. 1977) (stating that aggravating factors include "where the murder was committed for hire,
where the murder itself was committed for pecuniary gain, or where the defendant hired another
to commit a murder for him").
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aggravating factor.195 Under a retributivist view of punishment, violation of the
heightened obligations one owes to family members aggravates the moral
wrongfulness of the crime and the punishment that is justly deserved. 196 Utilitarian
considerations likewise support treating a family relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. Given that persons spend a good portion of their lives around family
members, an increased need exists both to incapacitate those who engage in domestic
violence and to send a strong message designed to deter such violence. 197 The draft
statute accordingly allows for the existence of a family relationship between the killer
and the victin, or the victim's children, to be treated as an aggravating factor relevant
to the grade of the offense in some circumstances.
The precise formulation and scope of the aggravating circumstance poses some
challenges. One issue concerns whether the existence of a family relationship should
be treated as an aggravating circumstance in mercy-killing cases such as Forest. The
best view is that it should not. Such a relationship gives defendants such as Forest a
more intimate knowledge of the "victim's" beliefs and values, and thus furnishes a
better basis for evaluating whether the family member-victim would regard the
killing as in his own interest.198 Rather than exacerbating the killing's wrongfulness,
the existence of a family relationship in these circumstances can have mitigating
significance by reinforcing a claim that the defendant genuinely and plausibly
believed that the killing was in the victim's best interests.
Another issue concerns whether a familial relationship should be treated as an
aggravating circumstance when the accused has killed a family member to protect
herself or her children from acts of serious violence committed by that member. In
such circumstances, the killer is responding to a serious breach of familial obligations
by the victim, and the killing has aspects of self-defense. From a retributivist
standpoint, these considerations diminish the inherent wrongfuflness of the killing.
They also tend to indicate that the killer does not pose a future danger to others' 99 and
does not stand in need of lengthy incapacitation, thereby substantially weakening
utilitarian arguments for the most severe level of punishment. The debate in the
caselaw and in the literature accordingly ha's focused on the degree to which the
offense is mitigated or even excused by the victim's abuse.200 The draft statute
195 See supra Part IH.B.
196 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., DWORKN, supra note 96, at 191; ToML. BEAUcHAMP & JAMEs F. CHDREss,
PRINCIPLES OFBIOmMDICALETHICs 172 (4th ed. 1994).
199 But cf. State v. Stafford, C.CA. No. 87-95-111,1988 WL 49907, at *6-7 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 19, 1988) (Byers, J., dissenting) (noting propensity of defendant, who had killed her
abusive husband, to marry alcoholics).
200 Seesupra note 128.
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phrases the aggravating factor to exclude cases in which the killing was precipitated
by a family member's violent abuse of the killer or her children.
(c)-(f) Commission of a felony, torture, multiple victims, vulnerable victim.
Following the Model Penal Code and state death penalty statutes, the draft statute
here identifies commission of a felony, torture, multiple victims, and the victim's
vulnerability or status as a law enforcement official as aggravating circumstances. 201
Each of these circumstances strengthens the utilitarian justifications for punishment
by indicating an increased dangerousness and need for incapacitation. On a
retributivist view, they exacerbate the wrongflness of the offense by indicating a
heightened insensitivity to the interests of others.
Prior convictions. The Model Penal Code and state death penalty provisions
include prior conviction for a violent felony as an aggravating factor.202 This
circumstance has undoubted relevance to the appropriate sentence. It bears on the
need for incapacitation and, since retributivists take into account the wrongdoer's
general character, the amount of punishment that is deserved on retributivist grounds.
However, as discussed in the preceding section, it would raise serious concerns about
efficiency and fairness to make aggravating and mitigating aspects of the defendant's
general background relevant to the grade of the offense at the trial on the merits.
203
The draft statute accordingly omits prior convictions, leaving their influence to
sentencing.
(2) Mitigating Circumstances
(a) Heat ofpassion. The draft statute in some respects conforms with, and in
other important respects differs from, the Model Penal Code and common law
formulations of manslaughter.
The draft statute conforms with existing law in requiring both an emotionally
overwrought state and some understandable excuse or justification for the loss of
control and the killing.204 Existing law is wise to require the concurrence of these two
conditions rather than to treat them each as separate mitigating factors. By itself, an
emotionally overwrought state can indicate a recurrent lack of self-control, a
propensity for violence, and an increased need for incapacitation.2 05 This is especially
201 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(c), (d), (h), at 109-10 (1980); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3592(cXl), (5), (6), (13), (14) (1994); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3Al.l(b),
5K2.8 (1996) (listing factors which may justify a sentence above the applicable federal sentencing
guideline range).
2 02 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(b), (e) (1980).
2 03 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
2 04 See supra Part I.B.
205 Cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNLES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (Supp. 1999) (policy statement)
(stating that defendant's mental or emotional state ordinarily is not so important as to justify a
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so when that state is not an understandable response to a wrongful and unpredictable
provocation. In addition, the provocations and reasons existing law identifies as
adequate to reduce the grade of the killing are ones that, on reflection, all reasonable
persons would regard as insufficient to fully excuse or justify the killing. In the
absence of an overwrought state, the actor should recognize the insufficiency of such
reasons. Thus, the draft statute here requires both a loss of emotional control and an
understandable reason for that loss.
The draft statute departs from the Model Penal Code and the common law in its
description of the provocations or excuses that may mitigate a killing. The Model
Penal Code's capacious "reasonable excuse" standard has been construed to permit
jurors to choose manslaughter, not murder, when the killer's excuse for his loss of
control is that a former girlfriend danced with another or the victim sought to leave
the household and exercise her legal right to end a marriage.20 6 Under the common
law, the victim's commission of adultery may mitigate the killing to manslaughter.
In these respects, the Model Penal Code and the common law allow mitigation in
cases where the killer's violent outburst reflects dangerousness and an increased need
for incapacitation.207
The draft statute redresses this undue breadth by requiring that the accused's state
of passion be provoked by the victim's commission of a serious legal wrong against
the accused or his family. This requirement would exclude mitigation in cases where
the defendant kills because the victim is exercising her legal right to divorce,20 8 was
dancing with another man,209 or, more controversially, committed adultery.210
At the same time it eliminates such undue breadth incorporated in existing law,
the draft statute avoids the undue narrowness associated with the common law. The
requirement of a serious legal wrong respects the basic principle underlying the
common law while avoiding the common law's arbitrary pigeonhole approach, which
restricts itself to a few archaic applications of that principle.
(b) & (c) Consent, duress, & necessity. Under existing law, consent, necessity,
or duress are not generally treated as circumstances that may reduce the grade of the
offense from murder to manslaughter.211 Nonetheless, some jurisdictions recognize
sentence below the applicable guideline range). A diminished capacity for emotional control
generally raises the same issues as diminished mental capacity. See infra note 215 (citing sources
that convey the concern that those who have diminished capacity stand in greater need of
incapacitation).
206 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 121-22, 162-64 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
209 State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155 (Conn. App. 1991).
2 10 See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
2 11 But cf Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.01(2)(d), 939.45(1), 939.46,939.47 (1996 & Supp. 1999)
(reducing first-degree murder to second-degree murder in cases involving duress or necessity).
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consent, duress, or necessity as complete defenses to homicide liability.212 The
arguments that these circumstances justify or excuse a homicide are certainly
respectable, as evidenced by the acceptance they have won. Even if insufficient to
support absolving actors of criminal liability altogether, the arguments at least
demonstrate that consent, duress, or necessity attenuate the retributive and utilitarian
justifications for criminal punishment The draft statute accordingly identifies
consent, duress, and necessity as mitigating circumstances relevant to the grade of the
offense.
These circumstances should be treated as mitigating even when not coupled with
heat-of-passion. Existing law recognizes certain provocations or excuses as adequate
to reduce murder to manslaughter only when coupled with extreme emotional or
mental disturbance. However, these provocations are ones that, on reflection, no
reasonable person would regard as excusing or justifying the killing. In contrast,
consent, duress, and necessity are circumstances that a reflective and reasonable
person might regard as excusing or justifying the killing. Cases involving consent,
duress, or necessity therefore can and often do involve premeditation, which is
mitigating in nature because it indicates both desirable moral reflection and
ambivalence. In those jurisdictions not recognizing a complete defense, consent,
duress, and necessity should be treated as mitigating circumstances without a further
requirement that the accused was emotionally overwrought.
(d) Imperfect self-defense. Under the law of many jurisdictions, an intentional
killing is reduced from murder to manslaughter where the accused genuinely, but
unreasonably, believed that deadly force was needed to repel an imminent unlawful
threat of serious violence.213 The draft statute accepts the strong and obvious
justification for treating such "imperfect self-defense."
Mental disability or disturbance. The Model Penal Code and many death penalty
statutes list extreme mental or emotional disturbance and/or diminished mental
capacity short of insanity as mitigating fitctors.2 14 Such circumstances may reduce the
wrongfulness of the crime on a retributive scale by diminishing the actor's
responsibility and moral culpability for his acts. But these circumstances also tend to
strengthen utilitarian justifications for punishment by indicating a dangerous lack of
2 12 A minority ofjurisdictions and the Model Penal Code recognize duress as a complete
defense to homicide liability. See LAFAvE & SCOTr, supra note 1, § 53(b), at 434-37; MODEL
PENALCODE 1, §§ 2.09,3.02 (1980). For authority accepting necessity as a defense to homicide
liability, see supra note 139.
As for consent, all jurisdictions treat voluntary passive euthanasia as legitimate in some
circumstances and Oregon has legalized physician-assisted suicide.
213 LAFAVF & ScoTt, supra note 1, § 7.1 1(a), at 665-66.
214 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b), (g) (1980); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(aX1), (6)
(1994).
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self-control and an increased need for incapacitation.215 In addition, making the
defendant's mental state and history relevant to the grade of the offense in a trial on
the merits raises efficiency concerns. The draft statute here accordingly declines to
treat mental disturbance or incapacity as mitigating circumstances relevant to the
grade of the offense and instead leaves the import of these matters to sentencing.
Absence ofprior record. As explained above, the draft statute does not treat the
defendant's prior record, character, and background as relevant to the grade of the
offense and instead leaves these matters to sentencing.216
C. Practical Implications
This section tests the practical implications of the draft statute by applying it to
some of the cases discussed previously.
1. Anderson
The Anderson case,217 which the California Supreme Court held to be a clear
ease of second-degree murder under the traditional paradigm, becomes a very clear
case of first-degree murder under the draft statute. Anderson undressed, chased, and
brutally butchered a ten-year-old child in whose household he was living. Numerous
aggravating circumstances accompanied the killing. First, the circumstance specified
in (1)(c) is present because the killing occurred while Anderson was attempting to and
did sexually abuse the child. Second, because Anderson inflicted numerous slash
wounds while chasing the bleeding young girl around the house, the killing involved
torture or the knowing infliction of protracted pain under (1)(d). Third, the victim's
age would also be treated as an aggravating factor under (1)(e). Finally, the de facto
parental role Anderson evidently played with respect to the victim would trigger the
"family relationship" aggravating circumstance set forth in (1)(b), depending on the
2 15 See MODELPENALCODE § 2103 cmt. 5, at 71-72 (1980); A. GOLDSTEn , T)HEINsANrrY
DEFENSE 206-07 (1967); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and DiminishedResponsibility
Defenses: Two Children ofa Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 850-53 (1977). The
federal sentencing guidelines reflect the concern that, in someone who has engaged in violence,
diminished capacitymight increase the need for incapacitation. See U.S. SENTENCNG GUIDELNEs
MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2)-(3) (2000) (listing diminished capacity as possibly warranting a sentence
below the guideline range except when "the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense
indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat
of violence" or when "the defendant's criminal history indicates aneed to incarcerate the defendant
t6 protect the public").
2 16 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.




definition of that term.218 In light of these numerous aggravating factors and the
absence of any mitigating factor, first-degree murder is the only appropriate
classification of the offense.
2. Dudley & Stephens
Instead of classifying Dudley and Stephens's premeditated lifeboat killing2 19 as
first-degree murder, as the traditional paradigm would, the draft statute would put the
killing in the least serious offense category.
The jury in Dudley & Stephens found that both Dudley and Stephens reasonably
believed killing the victim was necessary to save the lives of three others. In a
jurisdiction that extended the necessity defense to homicide cases,2 2 0 this finding
would absolve Dudley and Stephens of any criminal liability. In a jurisdiction that
declined to recognize necessity as a complete defense, the mitigating circumstance set
forth in (2)(c) would apply.
The only aggravating circumstance that conceivably may apply to the facts of
Dudley & Stephens is (1)(a), which covers planned killings where the planning
exhibits "exclusive concern for the accused's selfish financial, sexual, emotional, or
other interests and callous disregard for the victim's interests." Dudley and Stephens
did plan the killing. However, they were not callously insensitive to the victim's
interests. They delayed the killing while a reasonable hope of rescue remained, and
killed only when the victim was close to death and they were themselves on the verge
of starvation. The best view, then, is that (1)(a) does not apply.
Because the killing involves a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstances, the draft statute would treat it as voluntary manslaughter.
3. Forest
Forest, who killed his debilitated and dying father, was convicted of first-degree
premeditated murder under the traditional paradigm. Under the draft statute, it is quite
unlikely that the killing could or would be placed in the most serious offense category.
218 The definition ofa,'amily" is hardly a settled matter. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEo. LU. 1519 (1994); Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PmL. & PUB.
AFFAmS 77 (1991); Martha Minow, The Free Exercise ofFamiies, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 925. No
doubt the proper definition depends on the context and the purposes of the definition in that
context. Here, the retibutive and utilitarian justifications for increased punishment would seem
to turn on whether Anderson had assumed parental duties of care with respect to the child.
2 19 The Queen v. Dudley& Stevens, 14 QJ3.D. 273 (1884); see supra notes 104-09, 137-45
and accompanying text.
220 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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No aggravating circumstances seem to apply. The killing was planned but, as in
Dudley & Stephens, the planning exhibited concern for the victim's interest rather
than callous indifference. Thus, the aggravating circumstance for premeditation
specified in (1)(a) would not apply.
The fact that Forest genuinely believed that the homicide was in his father's
interests would not alone justify overlooking his family relationship to the victim as
an aggravating circumstance. His view must have some justification; it must be one
that jurors can understand and sympathize with. Given that Forest's father had no
prospect of recovery, was facing imminent death, and evidently was experiencing
physical and/or psychic pain, ajury might well find Forest's view of his father's best
interests to be understandable. If so, the family relationship aggravating factor set
forth in (lXc) would not apply. The absence of any aggravating factor would preclude
a first-degree murder verdict.
The mitigating circumstance described in (2)(b) would exist ifthe facts show that
Forest's father consented to the killing to relieve suffering. The report of the case does
not describe the facts pertinent to this issue, which the traditional paradigm wrongly
treats as irrelevant to the grade of the offense. The son's belief that the killing was in
his father's best interests, while sufficient to avoid the aggravating factor specified in
(1)(c), would not be sufficient to trigger the mitigating circumstance described in
(2)(b), which requires consent. If the father had the capacity to give consent at the
time of the killing, his actual consent would be required. In the event he lacked such
capacity, then the focus would shift, as it does in cases of passive euthanasia for
incompetent patients, to whether consent fairly could be implied from the father's
prior statements, beliefs, and values.
Under the draft statute, therefore, the killing would probably be classified as
either voluntary manslaughter or second-degree murder. In a troubling case such as
Forest, the debatable nature of the proper offense classification is a virtue rather than
a vice. The traditional paradigm focuses solely on whether the killing was
premeditated. This focus is perverse in cases such as Forest, which involve genuine
moral dilemmas and where reflection therefore indicates the understandable existence
of moral ambivalence. In contrast, the draft statute focuses the jury's attention on
precisely the vexing issues that bear most strongly on a moral valuation of the act and
on the need for criminal punishment.
D. Objections
This section briefly responds to two objections likely to be pressed against the
draft statute proposed here: That it gives juries undue discretion, and that it
undermines the role played by existing death penalty statutes.
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1. Discretion
The principal criticism of the new paradigm, which has been directed at its role
in implementing the death penalty, has been that it gives sentencing judges and juries
too much discretion.221 This objection to some degree rests on opposition to the death
penalty rather than a dispassionate assessment of the new paradigm's merits as a
general grading mechanism. The strong public support for the death penalty means
that those who oppose it on moral or religious'grounds have a decidedly uphill battle
in the political process. To succeed in the courts opponents must rely upon Funnan's
theme of undue sentencing discretion. 222 Strongly felt opposition to the death penalty,
together with Furman, invite exaggeration of discretion associated with the new
paradigm.
In the death penalty context, the broad-based objection that the new paradigm
creates a constitutionally unacceptable degree of discretion has been rejected. 223 Such
a constitutional objection would fare even more poorly if lodged against the new
paradigm as a general grading framework, apart from its role in implementing the
death penalty.
Still, as a matter of policy, the undue discretion objection raises serious issues
and deserves a considered response. One complaint is that the new paradigm relies
upon aggravating circumstances that are ambiguous and nearly all-encompassing.224
Another complaint is that the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances is without method.225 These criticisms are right in identifying the bases
of the discretion that the new paradigm gives to juries. But they fall considerably short
as reasons to reject the new paradigm in favor of the traditional grading paradigm.
A starting point is that, at least in many jurisdictions, the traditional paradigm
gives juries unduly broad and unguided discretion to draw lines among offenses.
Courts in many jurisdictions have reduced the term "premeditation" to "a mystifying
cloud of words. '226 Some juries undoubtedly use this "unstructured discretion2 27 to
221 See, e.g., citations, supra note 13.
222 See generally supra Part IA.
223 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 400-02 (1999) (plurality opinion);
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,974 (1994); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,875-77 (1983);
Steiker & Stelker, supra note 13, at 378-89. For one case in which an undue discretion objection
succeeded, see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
224 See, eg., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits ofLegal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital
Cases, 94 MicH. L. REv. 2590, 2608-10 (1996); Givelber, supra note 13, at 412; David J.
Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some Thoughts about Money, Myth, and Morality,
37 U. KAN. L. REv. 443,450 (1989).
225 See Stelker, supra note 224, at 2608-10; Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 13, at 127-28.
226 Cardozo, supra note 84, at 100.
227 People v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d 434,447 (Mich. App. 1971).
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take implicit account of other aggravating circumstances, which is the courts'
unstated rationale for diluting "premeditation's" ordinary meaning in the first place.
In many jurisdictions the traditional paradigm also gives jurors undue discretion to
draw the line between murder and manslaughter. Eleven jurisdictions use the Model
Penal Code's provision, which reduces murder to manslaughter if the killer acted
under an extreme emotional or mental disturbance for which there is a reasonable
excuse or explanation.228 By design, this provision provides exceedingly little
guidance as to what constitutes a "reasonable excuse or explanation" and leaves
jurors essentially on their own. Jurors have somewhat comparable discretion in those
jurisdictions that have abandoned the common law pigeonholes of adequate
provocation in favor of instructing juries that any provocation may suffice so long as
it would cause a reasonable person to lose emotional control. 229
Such discretion produces undesirable consequences. First, it leads to inconsistent
results. When a court gives jurors open-ended instructions on the meaning of
premeditation, some juries can be expected to fall back on premeditation's ordinary
meaning, which is well understood.230 Other juries will no doubt use the fuzzy
instructions on "premeditation" as a guise to take at least implicit account of other
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In doing so, they are on their own as to
which circumstances count, and views can be expected to differ among jurors and
juries. Different juries also presumably have disparate notions of what constitutes a
reasonable excuse or adequate provocation sufficient to mitigate murder to
manslaughter. Second, such unguided discretion can produce indefensible results, as
when murder is reduced to manslaughter where the provocation was that the victim
exercised her legal right to end an intimate relationship231 or made an unwanted
homosexual advance.232
2 28 See supra note 49.
2 29 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
2 30 See supra notes 63, 86 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
232 See Schick v. State, 570 N.E.2d 918, 921-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (reducing murder to
manslaughter based on such a provocation); State v. Skaggs, 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Ariz. 1978) (en
banc) (allowing instruction on provocation); Walden v. State, 307 S.E.2d 474,475 (Ga. 1983)
(notingjuryinstruction on voluntary manslaughter); People v. Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1139
(Il. 1986) (indicating defendant found guilty of voluntary manslaughter where parties stipulated
that victim made a homosexual advance); People v. Lenser, 430 N.E.2d 495, 498 (111. App. Ct.
1982) (allowing instruction on voluntary manslaughter). But see Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 479
N.E.2d 1371, 1375-76 (Mass. 1985) (assuming that if victim's homosexual advances constituted
reasonable provocation, defendant was not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction).
For a discussion of these cases and the issues they raise, see Dressier, supra note 124; Robert B.
Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient
Provocation, 80 CALF. L. REV. 133 (1992).
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The new paradigm substantially minimizes the undue discretion associated with
the traditional paradigm. Instead of allowing juries discretion implicitly to consider
aggravating circumstances other than premeditation, it explicitly identifies the
circumstances that permissibly may be taken into account. As compared with the
Model Penal Code's manslaughter provisions and other expanded versions of the
common law approach, the new paradigm also gives juries substantially more
guidance as to which excuses suffice to mitigate murder to manslaughter. By refusing
to allow a loss of emotional control to mitigate murder to manslaughter unless the loss
was provoked by the victim's commission of "a serious legal wrong," the draft statute
would help avoid the indefensible results associated with the undue breadth of the
traditional paradigm.
Although the new paradigm in these respects limits discretion as compared with
the traditional paradigm, it does introduce new sources of discretion. For instance, the
draft statute does not make the planned nature of a killing an aggravating
circumstance by itself. Planning becomes an aggravating circumstance only when it
"exhibited exclusive concern for the accused's selfish financial, sexual, emotional,
or other interests and callous disregard for the victim's interests." In addition, the
statute lists as mitigating circumstances the victim's "consent' to the killing and a loss
of emotional control provoked by the commission of a "serious legal wrong" on the
part of the victim. The interpretation and application of these phrases call for the
exercise of significant judgment and discretion.
There are two principal justifications for this discretion. The first is that some
significant discretion is an inevitable part of any system that gives juries a meaningful
role in the grading process. For the criminal jury to play its accepted and appropriate
role of assuring that the exercise of governmental coercion comports with basic
community values2 33 legal standards must leave room for discretion.
The second justification is that, by channeling the discretion that allows
accordance with more appropriate considerations, the draft statute can be expected
to improve substantially upon the accuracy of classification decisions. Traditional law
sometimes gives jurors unfettered discretion, thereby opening the door to inconsistent
results and the influence of arbitrary considerations. Where the traditional paradigm
does channel discretion, it often does so along the wrong lines. Some jurisdictions and
some juries do hew to "premeditation's" ordinary meaning of planning. But
premeditation, so defined, sometimes has mitigating significance, as in the Forest
mercy-killing 34 and the Dudley & Stephens lifeboat cases.235 Also, other aggravating
circumstances can outweigh whatever mitigating significance attaches to the absence
of premeditation. The sadistic but impulsive child-killing in Anderson illustrates this
233 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 104-09, 137-45 and accompanying text.
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kind of case, which arises with some frequency.236 As for the line between murder
and manslaughter, the common law pigeonholes of adequate provocation do limit
discretion. However, these pigeonholes are both overinclusive because they treat
provocations such as adultery and dueling as adequate and underinclusive because
they treat mitigating circumstances such as necessity and victim consent as irrelevant
As compared with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances on which the
traditional approach relies, each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set
forth in the draft statute bear more strongly on the utilitarian and retributive purposes
of punishment and better comport with commonly held moral judgments.
Consequently, the draft statute promises to do a much better job of classifying
homicides according to their relative seriousness.
Similar considerations justify the discretion that the new paradigm introduces
through its requirement that aggravating and mitigating circumstances be weighed
where they coexist In the death penalty context, critics object that this weighing is left
to the unfettered discretion of jurors.237
At the outset, this objection becomes much less forceful insofar as the new
paradigm is used to grade the offense rather than decide the appropriate sentence.
Arguable aggravating and mitigating circumstances are almost always present in the
sentencing phase of death penalty cases because the list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances includes circumstances relating to the defendant's background.238
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the defense may rely on any relevant
mitigating circumstances, not just those specified by statute.2 39 In contrast, as outlined
in the draft statute proposed here, the new paradigm as a grading device excludes
circumstances relating to the defendant's background and character. The necessity for
weighing, routine in death penalty cases, is relatively rare in the grading context. For
example, none of the test cases discussed in this Part involves the simultaneous
presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Although juries are given significant discretion when they are required to weigh
in the relatively rare cases involving both aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the alternative of avoiding such weighing would be worse. It is certainly true that
there is no scientific table of weights ajury can use to compare the significance of, for
example, a breach of familial obligations with a state of passion brought on by the
victim's commission of a serious wrong.2 40 Weighing the relative importance of such
236 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 225.
238 Persons who are convicted of death-eligible offenses routinely point to a history of
childhood abuse as a mitigating circumstance. Crocker, supra note 186, at 1143.
239 See supra note 41.
240 See ZaMuNG & HAWIaNS, supra note 33, at 81-91(1986); Gottlieb, supra note 224, at
450. In his famous 1937 article, which influenced the drafters of the Model Penal Code's death
penalty provisions, Herbert Wechsler acknowledged that "it is impossible in the present state of
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circumstances involves the exercise of moral judgment and introduces discretion. To
forego weighing altogether, however, would hobble the jury's function of buffering
governmental coercion with the community's moral sense.241 It would also produce
unacceptable results. Traditional law, for instance, treats the victim's commission of
adultery as a mitigating circumstance, but arbitrarily takes no account of a
simultaneous presence of the killer's breach of family obligations and other
aggravating circumstances such as the killer's sadism. The aggravating and mitigating
circumstances specified in the draft statute are strongly tied to the retributive and
utilitarian justifications for criminal punishment. Ignoring one or another set of
circumstances produces unacceptable results.
Several lines of reasoning, then, converge to answer the undue discretion
objection. First, the new paradigm substantially minimizes the undue discretion
created by the traditional paradigm, at least as it exists in many jurisdictions. It is by
no means clear that the new paradigm, on balance, increases discretion as compared
with the traditional paradigm. Second, the new paradigm limits discretion based upon
a better set of considerations and improves the accuracy of classification decisions.
Insofar as it channels discretion, the traditional paradigm does so based upon
considerations having an inconsistent relationship with the purposes of criminal
punishment and commonly held moral judgments. Third, in giving juries discretion,
the new paradigm permits juries to play a meaningful role in the grading process,
thereby honoring the jury's role in legitimizing governmental coercion. Even if one
indulges the debatable assumptions that the new paradigm increases discretion and
that such discretion is undesirable, whatever disadvantages flow therefrom are
outweighed by the benefit of enhanced accuracy.
2. The Death Penalty
Another potential objection to the draft statute is that it would stack the deck in
favor of the death penalty. The draft statute permits a verdict of first-degree murder
only when either at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances are present or the aggravating circumstance(s) substantially outweighs
any mitigating circumstance(s). Given that death penalty statutes use the same
aggravating-mitigating circumstances fiamnework, a verdict of first-degree murder
might seem to imply that death is the appropriate punishment under existing death
penalty statutes. In essence, this objection maintains that the new paradigm cannot be
used both as a general grading framework and as a means of implementing the death
penalty.
knowledge to determine with any precision what weight should be given the various aggravating
and extenuating circumstances, either absolutely or relatively." Wechsler & Michael, supra note
61, at 1301.
241 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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This objection correctly recognizes that the same aggravating circumstances
relevant to the grade of the offense would also be considered in the penalty phase of
a death penalty case. This would mean that a defendant who has been convicted of
first-degree murder would enter the penalty phase with the jury already having found
the existence of an aggravating circumstance that could justify imrposition of the death
penalty. However, this should not give rise to an objection that the penalty phase is
unfairly skewed in favor of the death penalty.
First, as a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court has held that an aggravating
circumstance may be used both to define the offense of capital murder in the guilt-
innocence phase and to support a decision in favor of death in the penalty phase. In
Lowenfield v. Phelps,242 the Court upheld a Louisiana death sentence where the sole
aggravating circumstance found by the jury in the sentencing phase was identical to
an element of the capital murder statute. The Constitution, the Court declared,
requires that the State 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty."'2 43 According to the Lowenfield Court, this narrowing may be
accomplished either by "narrow[ing] the definition of capital offenses... so that the
jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or... [by] findings of aggravating
circumstances at the penalty phase."244
Second, as a matter of policy, the considerations that are relevant to the grade of
the offense are also relevant to the appropriate punishment The circumstances that
the draft statute identifies as relevant to the grade of the offense were chosen because
they bear most strongly on the retributive and utilitarian justifications for punishment
These considerations are obviously relevant in deciding not only the appropriate
sentencing range but also where a given case should be placed within a sentencing
range. It would be highly anomalous to take the position that the considerations most
directly linked to the overriding purposes of criminal punishment are irrelevant either
to the grade of the offense or, in death penalty jurisdictions, to the appropriateness of
death.
Third, any unwarranted skewing in favor of death can be avoided by instructing
the jury to apply a higher standard in the penalty phase. The same considerations
relevant in deciding whether a killing belongs in the most serious offense category
also bear on the appropriateness of the death penalty. But a conclusion that a killing
belongs in the most serious offense category does not imply that the death penalty is
warranted. The death penalty is appropriately reserved for the worst cases of first-
degree murder. Therefore, the findings necessary to support first-degree murder-
either that one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances are present
or that any aggravating circumstance(s) substantially outweigh(s) any mitigating
circumstance(s)-should not automatically trigger the death penalty. In considering
242 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
243 Id. at 244 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
244 1d. at 246.
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the sentencer instead must employ a more
demanding standard. The death penalty requires a preponderance of aggravating over
mitigating circumstances greater than that needed to support a verdict of first-degree
murder. Juries accordingly should be instructed that, to justify a sentence of death,
they must conclude something along the lines that any aggravating circumstance(s)
outweigh(s) any mitigating circumstance(s) so strongly that death is the appropriate
punishment Although this requires jurors to draw distinctions of degree, the law of
homicide elsewhere asks jurors to draw such lines.245
Fourth, a verdict of first-degree murder under the draft statute does not imply the
appropriateness of the death penalty for the additional reason the sentencing phase
considers circumstances not relevant to the grade of the offense. Principal among
these would be circumstances relating to the defendant's background and character,
which the draft statute excludes from the grading phase in the interests of efficiency
and fairness.2 46 Any prior convictions for a dangerous felony, now routinely listed in
death penalty statutes as an aggravating circumstance, would be considered in the
penalty but not the grading phase. The defendant's history of physical and/or sexual
abuse as child, which is regularly introduced as a mitigating circumstance in death
penalty cases, would also be considered.
The proposal here, then, does not unduly predispose the sentencing phase in
favor of death or in other ways that would render existing death penalty statutes
unworkable. Many of the same circumstances would be relevant to both grading and
sentencing. Given that both inquiries share the common purpose of classifying
homicides and offenders according to their culpability, this is as it should be. Due to
the higher standard applicable and the additional circumstances considered in the
sentencing phase, that phase will remain distinctive and its outcome far from a
foregone conclusion. The new paradigm can be used both for grading and for
implementing the death penalty.
V. CONCLUSION
A profound transformation is already underfoot in the way that the law classifies
intentional homicides. A new paradigm has emerged. Although originating as a
means of implementing death penalty, it has clear implications for the general grading
of intentional homicides and its use has been gradually expanding beyond the death
penalty context. This fundamental change now brewing in the law deserves notice
and critical evaluation.
245 With respect to unintentional killings, for instance, depraved heart murder and reckless
manslaughter involve the same criteria and the distinction between them is one of degree. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 4, at 21-22; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3402(b) (1995)
(defining depraved heart murder as reckless killing "in circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life" (emphasis added)).
246 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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This article's critical thesis is that this incipient change should be embraced and
expedited. The traditional paradigm frequently produces disturbing results. First-
degree murder anomalously encompasses mercy and necessity killings such as in
Forest and Dudley & Stephens but not the savage killing of a child to whom the killer
owed a duty of care such as in Anderson. Also, while a killer's excitation over the
"infidelity" of a spouse who moved out and announced her intention to divorce may
be used to reduce murder to manslaughter, the fact that the killer brutally shot his
spouse in full view of their child and deprived his child of her custodial parent is
irrelevant to the grade of the offense.
The new paradigm helps avoid such grotesque distortions of the purposes of
criminal punishment and basic moral sensibilities. It does so by changing the
classification criteria, expanding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
relevant to the grade of the offense, and permitting aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to be weighed against one another where they both exist.-Of course,
the content inserted into this framework merits debate and modification. Contrary to
existing versions of the new paradigm, for instance, the argument here maintains that
the killer's breach of familial obligations should weigh in as an aggravating factor in
many cases.
Criminal statutes are often ambiguous and/or incorporate the common law power
ofjudges to change the law. Through the exercise of their powers of interpretation as
well as through their often considerable sentencing discretion, judges may be able to
give effect to notions such as the aggravating nature of the killer's breach of familial
obligations and the mitigating nature of consent, duress, or necessity. Judges, of
course, cannot alter the basic classification criteria written into existing statutes.
Scholars and others in the legal community need to encourage legislatures to hasten
their partial movements toward a better approach.
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